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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
The Libyan Gamble
The first thing that needs to be said about the
American military attack on Libya is that it was entirely justified. The second thing that needs to be said
is that it may or may not have been wise policy. There
are many situations where prudence enjoins what justice might allow; only the passage of time will demonstrate whether in the Libyan case the United States
should have refrained from doing what it had a political and moral right to do.
Not everyone concedes that political and moral
right. While few deny that under Col. Moammar
Khadafy Libya has become a major source of murderous terrorist activity-the evidence is simply too overwhelming for denial to be credible-it is still argued by
some that the U.S. bombing raid was unjustifiable. For
these critics the American attack reduced our nation to
the Libyan level. The use of lethal force is legitimate
only as a last resort, they argue , and the U.S. should
more fully have exhausted its diplomatic options before unleashing its military might.
Such criticism ignores the substantial diplomatic efforts, stretching over several years, that the U.S. made
to find non-military solutions to the Khadafy problem.
As President Reagan noted, America tried quiet diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic sanctions, official
threats, a show of force-all to no avail. As for the
suggestion that we should have taken our case to the
World Court or the United Nations, can anyone at this
late stage take such ideas seriously? Has either institution given the slightest indication over the years that
it had any intention or capability of dealing with the
terrorist threat?
Natural justice and the UN charter reserve to nations the right to defend themselves and their citizens
against aggressive actions , and in bombing Libya in retaliation for its destruction of American (and other)
lives the U.S. was acting within its rights . Those who
term the raid an act of aggression do no more justice
to the facts of the matter than they do to the ordinary
meaning of words.
The more serious moral argument against the
bombing involves the taking of innocent civilian lives.
This must not be passed over lightly. The death of uninvolved men, women, and children ought to be a
matter of genuine remorse, not pro forma "regret. " A
nation that presumes to act in defense of innocent life
has a particular responsibility to conduct its operations
with care for the welfare of non-combatants. We canMay, 1986

not shield ourselves with the clinical vocabulary of
"surgical strikes"; such chillingly technocratic language
evades reality and skirts responsiblity. It seems clear
that we did not intend the sacrifice of innocents, but
we must not deny that we were involved m their
deaths.
At the same time, however, it is necessary to point
out where the ultimate responsibility for the casualties
lies. Col. Khadafy's people died-his own child diedbecause of his actions. Without his criminal instigation
of terrorist activities the tragedy of Tripoli would never
have occurred. We were involved-and that cannot be
glossed over-but it is Khadafy himself who is centrally
responsible for the slaughter of his own innocents.
For most critics, the case against the American raid
is not so much moral as pragmatic. The bombing, they
suggest, may not have been wrong intrinsically, but it
was wrong politically. It cost us more than it accomplished. At this point judgment becomes clouded
and uncertain. One can build plausible logical arguments either for or against the Administration's actions , but we need continually to remind ourselves that

To Our Subscribers
The economics of magazine publishing is among the
most dismal aspects of the dismal science. The Cresset,
like so many other journals of opinion, exists only by
grace of a generous subsidy-provided, in this case, by
Valparaiso University through the good offices of its
President (and our Publisher) Robert V. Schnabel.
That subsidy, however, cannot carry the whole load
of the journal's costs. We have continued to absorb
higher expenses (including enormously-increased postal
rates) without adding to subscribers' costs since 1983.
But we can no longer resist a modest increase.
As of our next issue in September, the cost of subscriptions to The Cresset will rise to $8.50 for one
year or $14.75 for two years. New subscriptions entered before that time can take advantage of the existing rates (one year, $7.50; two years, $13.00). Present
subscribers can also beat the increase by extending their
subscriptions before next fall; simply send in your
checks at the old rates before September 1 and your
subscriptions will be extended from their present dates
of expiration.
We hope our readers will agree that The Cresset
remains one of the true bargains in print journalism.
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it is not logic but experience that is the law of history.
It is only somewhere down the road that we will be
able confidently to judge the results of the Administration's actions. However things eventually turn out, we
ought to keep in mind how indeterminate they appeared at the present moment.
Those who disagree with the Administration begin
by arguing that the U.S. has built an essentially
minor--or at least manageable-irritation into a major
problem, that we have made of Khadafy more than he
ought to be. The American action, they say, was disproportionate both in itself and in its results; it has
managed to turn an international villain into an object
of sympathy, a lowly David contending against a superpower Goliath. America has awkwardly transformed itself from aggrieved party to blundering bully.
Some of this may be dismissed as trivial, misguided,
or sentimental-as indeed it is-but it does touch on
a real issue. Self-respecting nations do not base their
policies on the vagaries of world opinion, but a responsible great power like the U.S. cannot ignore the
damage to its interests that can result from actionshowever justified in themselves-that lower its estimation in others' eyes. World opinion counts in so far as
it affects our success in furthering our ends in the
community of nations. What others think of us should
not determine our actions, but it must remain part of
the calculus by which we set our policies.
.R eaction against the Libyan raid has been strong in
the Arab world, in Europe, and in the Soviet Union.
How deep that reaction goes and how long it will last
are matters difficult to gauge. The costs to America
are real, though it seems doubtful that the USSR will
allow its relations with us to be determined by the Libyan affair or that our European allies will be permanently estranged over it. The effects will probably be
strongest in the Middle East, though public and official opinion there is so volatile-and in so many ways
beyond our control (short of dropping our support of
Israel)-that it is difficult to assess what influence it
can or should have in our policy formation.
In the end, the pragmatic case against the bombing
rests essentially on the argument that what we did will
not hinder terrorism but will give us more of it. That
argument is weighty: 1) Khadafy may have been
prompted by our attack not to a new sobriety but to
a renewed and vengeful hatred; 2) even in the unlikely case that Libya has been neutralized as a terrorist threat, other Middle Eastern sources of terror
(e.g. Syria and Iran) remain, and there is no reason to
assume that they will be deterred by the Tripoli raid;
3) in any case, even if all state-supported terrorism
could somehow be eliminated or at least substantially
reduced, there would continue to exist innumerable
4

private terrorist groups and individuals that operate
independently of state support, that cannot effectively
be dealt with by military action, and that now have yet
another reason for striking out against the American
enemy.
The raid on Libya may have eased American frustration in the short run, this argument concludes, but
its long-range effect will be to generate more of what
caused the frustration in the first place. Suppose, as is
likely, that the terrorists raise the ante of violence.
How far are we willing to go in further response?
Does America possess-does it want to possess-the
ruthlessness that the Reagan policy may require?
In reply to all this, the Administration argues in effect that however problematic its military action may
have been, it was justified both by its inherent justice
and by the absence of acceptable alternatives. After all,
they say, how effective have restraint and diplomacy
been in dealing with terrorism? Hardening the target
will not suffice-not when there exists a whole world
of targets-and talk of combating terrorism by dealing
with its "root causes" is pointless. The root cause of
Arab terrorism is not simply the Palestinian issue, as
is so often assumed; it is rather the existence of Israel
itself. The fanatics who bomb nightclubs, blow up
airplanes, and shoot down women and children will
not be bought off by a partition of the West Bank.
They demand of us what we cannot in conscience deliver: the abandonment of Israel.
So also elsewhere. In a world of intensely-felt religious, ideological, national, and tribal grievances, there
will always exist "root causes" that justify terrorism to
those who engage in it and yet that cannot, for a great
variety of reasons, be satisfactorily dealt with by political means. We may not be able to eliminate terrorism
entirely, the President's defenders say, but we should
recognize that it is not simply a political problem and
that we must retain the right to protect ourselves by
any means necessary against those who perpetrate it.
Doing something, the Administration concedes, is dangerous; doing nothing would be intolerable.
There we are. President Reagan and his advisors
have set out on an uncertain and highly dangerous
path. The American people, for the moment, support
them. It is difficult not to sympathize with the instinct
that leads them to do so. It may turn out that the policy will act to deter terrorism or at least not expand it
beyond its current levels. In that case, Reagan will be
able to count his policy a success. But if the policy results in an inconclusive and ever-expanding pattern of
violence, the President's support will disappear and
the U.S. may find itself slipping into a quagmire different from, but depressingly analogous to, the one we
stumbled into in Vietnam.
Cl
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Dave Andrusko

THE PRO-LIFE MOMENTUM
Why the Anti-Abortion Movement Has Gained the Initiative

As the Abortion Wars grind their way toward a
third decade, not surprisingly the metaphor of endless
stalemate dominates the writings of many thoughtful
analysts. From the pro-life perspective such an interpretation, while not wholly inaccurate, remains
seriously misleading. It does, it is true, represent a decided improvement on the typical media portrait of a
social movement perpetually on the brink of final defeat. But it also drastically minimizes the Movement's
real strength if, as I am persuaded, we have moved
through a period of essential equilibrium into a new
era of resurgent pro-life momentum. Indeed, this entire essay is an attempt to document such a conclusion.
If we come to understand why so many observers
(some more unbiased than others) are convinced nothing can or will change, my thesis of fundamental
breakth rough may not seem as counter-intuitive as it
appears at first glance. Any number of examples could
be offered, but let's take a recent example from the
newspaper of record. New York Times reporter Adam
Clymer succinctly recapitulates the essentials of the
case for stalemate in an article accompanying the results of a Times poll published February 23, 1986. As
his lead puts it, "The political fight over abortion,
which once provoked hopes and fears of a constitutional amendment and a Government more concerned
and involved in the morality of its citizens, has settled
into trench warfare."
However, as so often has been the case with the reporting of the abortion debate, Clymer's analysis is
long-since outdated. Now, it is quite true that between
1973, the year the Court handed down its Roe v. Wade

Dave Andrusko is Editor of the National Right to Life
News. A graduate of the University of Minnesota, he has
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the Future (1984) and Call to Conscience (1985) .
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decision, and November 1980, when pro-lifer Ronald
Reagan was elected President, it made sense to talk of
two armies slugging it out, with pro-choicers almost
casually fending off all but a few pro-life initiatives.
Such a case could plausibly be defended even through
1984.
But not any more. During 1985, in public utterances
and especially in closed-door sessions, pro-choice advocates acknowledged that the tables had turned. So radically had the momentum swung in the direction of
the Pro-Life Movement that even the staunchest prochoice partisans admitted it was necessary to go back
to the drawing board if they were going to recapture
control of the public policy debate. The proximate
agent of that remarkable turnabout? The dramatic,
powerful, and highly controversial film The Silent
Scream.
As almost everyone knows by now, the crux of this
28-minute film is a real-time ultrasound showing the
actual abortion of a twelve-week-old unborn baby.
From the moment National Right to Life made this remarkable film the centerpiece of its January 22, 1985
press conference, criticism of and kudos for The Silent
Scream have completely dominated every aspect of the
public debate over abortion.
The reason this is so becomes evident when we
grasp how widely the film's message was heard. Pollster Louis Harris wrote last September that an astonishing 42 per cent of the American public had
seen, heard about, or read about the film . In a survey
conducted for Planned Parenthood, Harris concluded
that "it may be claimed that as many as 6 per cent of
the total public became more opposed to abortion as
a result of seeing The Silent Scream."
A number of pro-choice proponents conceded the
film's power, while others tacitly acknowledged its
agenda-shifting impact. For example, Allan Rosenfield, chairman of the board of Planned Parenthood,
called it "the most powerful thing the right-to-life
movement has put out to date." Lisa Akchin of Maryland Planned Parenthood told the Washington Post that
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"There's been a lot of discussion and gnashing of teeth
and tearing of hair about how to deal with it." And a
delegate to the June 1985 convention of the National
Abortion Federation was even more blunt. After the
film came out, abortion supporters, she lamented,
sank into "the pit of despair."
Later, we shall again consider the film in the
broader context of "How Technology is Reframing the
Abortion Debate" (as pro-choice ethicist Daniel Callahan titled an essay in the February 1986 issue of the
Hastings Center Report). But first, to return to the perspective that sees the controversy through the grid of
deadlock. If, as I am persuaded, The Silent Scream represents a watershed in the seemingly interminable
abortion controversy, why do shrewd observers conclude, as Clymer did, that it is "unlikely" that there is
"solid support for sweeping changes in either direction"?
The answer reveals a chronic weakness in media
coverage of the issue. Clymer and other knowledgeable commentators unwittingly frame the question of
how the abortion battle is progressing in so rigid a
fashion that it virtually preordains a nothing-will-orcan-change conclusion.
For example, the barometer for measuring change is
typically two-fold. First, as suggested by Clymer's lead
sentence, has the Pro-Life Movement passed a Human
Life Amendment (HLA) to the Constitution? If it
hasn't, the conclusion normally drawn is that it doesn't
have sufficient public support. Second, how are the
public opinion polls running? Is there clear and unambiguous evidence the American people wish to "ban
abortion"? If not, many observers deduce that the current abortion policy represents a rough equilibrium
that will likely endure.
My argument is that the Movement is making extraordinary progress-but is given no credit. Two
reasons explain why: (1) the standards the Movement
must meet before it is conceded to be making real
headway are unrealistically stringent and/or miss alternative but equally valid measures of progress; and (2)
public ambiguity about the issue is interpreted to
mean that no significant shifts can be in the offing.
Let's take the first yardstick of success, the passage
of an HLA to the Constitution. Surely, if the rancorous wrangling over the proposed federal Equal Rights
Amendment teaches us anything it is that any controversial amendment faces very long odds.
At first blush, the ERA had everything going for it:
the blessing of many of the most powerful members in
Congress, the best wishes of virtually the entire media
establishment, and-its ace in the hole-the reputation
that opposition to the ERA was proof positive that the
critic did not believe in equality for women. Moreover,
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real opposition to the ERA did not coalesce until after
the ERA had passed Congress and thirty of the required thirty-eight states had ratified the measure.
Yet, against all odds, it lost.
An HLA enjoys none of the ERA's advantages and,
in addition, is directed at a specific Supreme Court
ruling, a condition usually not helpful to any attempt
to ratify an amendment. Making matters even worse,
staunch pro-choice supporters are key Congressional
players in even securing a hearing for an HLA. That
alone makes passage nearly impossible without huge
pro-life majorities in both houses of Congress.

Roe v. Wade is an exercise in judicial
improvisation, a cobbling together of
selected pieces of evidence to reach
a predetermined decision consistent
with the Court majority's preferences.
Moreover, making passage of an HLA the index of
progress ignores that the Movement has been extraordinarily successful in winning what little it has been allowed to under the stringent limits established by a Supreme Court majority wedded to Roe until death do
them part. Most of the success stories have been in the
area of cutting off federal funds to pay for and promote abortion. Given the Court's passionate commitment to Roe, pro-life options are sharply circumscribed.
So a fairer measure would be to ask whether the
Movement is succeeding step by step in securing everything it can, in light of the boundaries established
by the Court. The answer is a resounding yes. Equally
important, and also overlooked, the Pro-Life Movement has defeated every single effort by pro-choice
advocates to expand the abortion "liberty."
And of course framing the issue as one of amending
the Constitution ignores the much more likely way Roe
would be overturned. There have been twenty-six
amendments to the Constitution. But the Supreme
Court has reversed itself explicitly on constitutional
decisions over one hundred times. While such action usually requires a turnover in personnel, the Court does
frequently reject its own earlier readings of the Constitution.
What encourages pro-lifers is that prospective justices do not need to be against abortion to find Roe repugnant. To many legal scholars, Roe is an exercise in
imperial judicial improvisation, a cobbling together of
selected pieces of evidence to reach a predetermined
decision consistent with a majority of the Court's social
The Cresset

philosophy. Even liberal legal scholars who are personally pro-choice, such as John Hart Ely and Archibald
Cox, find Roe jurisprudentially untenable.
If there is no consensus that a reasonable reading of
the Constitution supports Roe-indeed, if the reverse
is more true-and if Roe represents the premier example of judicial activism, then any believer in judicial restraint (such as Ronald Reagan) would likely nominate
men and women who would have great difficulty reaffirming the holdings in Roe.
What I've said thus far can be summarized in three
sentences. Legislatively, pro-lifers are on a short leash,
given the expansive, all-encompassing pro-choice
thrust of Roe. They have won virtually everything they
could win and rebuffed pro-choice counter-initiatives.
More to the point, it is reasonable to believe that with
the appointment of one or two new Supreme Court
justices faithful to the Constitution, its text and history, Roe will be reversed.
The second gauge of change suggested by those
who argue that the abortion debate is hopelessly stalemated is public opinion as measured by public opinion
polls. Indeed, Clymer believes a "key reason" a deadlock between pro-life and pro-choice forces exists is
the public's ambiguity on the issue. But a close reading
of what the Times poll reveals strongly suggests an interpretation different from Clymer's as to the nature
and significance of that ambiguity.
As have many recent polls, the Times survey shows
a growing anti-Roe majority. Fifty-six per cent of the
people questioned said abortion should either not be
legal at all (16 per cent) or only in such cases as saving
the life of the mother, rape, or incest (40 per cent).
Fifty-five per cent said they agreed with the statement
that "abortion is the same thing as murdering a child."
These constitute strong majorities on toughly worded
questions (from the pro-lifer's point of view).
But Clymer cites responses to other survey questions
and concludes not only that most Americans are ambivalent on the abortion issue (true) but also that these
"conflicts in the public [make] unlikely solid support
for sweeping changes in either direction" (decidedly
not true).
Clymer notes that "only" three-quarters of the 56
per cent against abortion-on-demand--or 41 per cent
of the total sample-want, in his words, "the Constitution amended to make their belief the law of the
land." (The actual question was, "Do you think the
Constitution should be amended to make this the
law?") Yet as any non-partisan student of polling
knows, people are notoriously reluctant to amend the
Constitution. The document is sacred to many, respected by all. No matter how strongly they may feel
on a particular subject, people are very hesitant to do
May, 1986

anything that alters a document that has stood the nation in such good stead for two centuries.
Even so, other surveys have shown more substantial
percentages willing to amend the Constitution, even
when the wording is loaded against the pro-life position. For example, a 1984 Washington Post/ABC News
poll of Democrats nationally found that 46 per cent
agreed with the statement that "There should be a
constitutional amendment banning abortion" (emphasis
added). There is much more hard-core opposition to
abortion in America than most people realize.
Clymer's second piece of evidence against the likelihood of change is that 66 per cent of the respondents
agreed that "abortion is sometimes the best thing in a
bad situation." We are to conclude, I gather, that the
fact that many of the same people who believe that
abortion is the same thing as killing children nonetheless also agree that there are times when abortion is
the lesser of two evils proves that the American people
are not ready for "sweeping changes in either direction." This is nonsense. Judging by their previous responses, most of the people clearly believe that an
abortion performed, for example, to save the mother's
life is the least bad choice in an awful situation. That
would hardly preclude them from opting for "sweeping changes," since no more than one per cent of the
1.6 million abortions performed yearly are for such
cases.
What can we conclude about the public's sentiments
on abortion? My own opinion is that the conclusion
drawn by Virginia Sackett in the April/May 1985 issue
of Public Opinion magazine is directly on target. She
writes, "People are extremely uncomfortable with the
idea of abortion. They think it is wrong, but they seem
reluctant to make moral decisions about it for others."
Sackett believes that this reluctance stems from our
American tradition of individualism, on the one hand,
and from fear of probable consequences to women on
the other. Virtually everyone is persuaded that if protection of law is returned to unborn babies, women
will nonetheless continue to have abortions with harmful, even fatal, results.
Quite frankly, nothing gives pause to more men and
women sympathetic to the pro-life perspective than
this dismal prognosis. This dilemma represents the
Gordian knot which the Movement must at least badly
fray if not cut before it is to rid America of the
scourge of abortion. Such a task presents a formidable
challenge to pro-lifers, because they are sincerely concerned for both mother and child and are unwilling to
sacrifice any lives.
While I would hardly claim to have the definitive
answer, I trust that some preliminary thoughts may
help us work our way toward a satisfactory answer.
7

What can pro-lifers say to those who declare, "Women
have always had abortions; they always will. The only
question is whether they will be safe and legal."
Let's begin with a very brief discussion of the related
issues of numbers and safety. By definition, the
number of criminal abortions prior to legalization is
unknowable, but we can make some educated guesses.
A careful study conducted by Dr. Thomas Hilgers of
Creighton University School of Medicine concludes
that the number of illegal abortions per year in the
pre-legalization era ranged from a low of 39,000 in
1950 to a high of 210,000 in 1961. In other words,
today we have eight times as many yearly aportions as
the highest pre-Roe figure.
And as Bernard Nathanson, co-founder of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), wrote
in his book, Aborting America, pro-choice activists have
simply made up the figure that 5,000-10,000 women
were dying yearly from illegal abortions. In fact, the
largest number of maternal deaths related to criminal
abortions in the twenty-five years prior to the Court's
1973 Roe v. Wade decision, according to Dr. Hilgers,
was 388 in 1948. The sharp drop in maternal deaths
related to abortion since the mid-I 940s had virtually
nothing to do with whether they were legal or illegal
and everything to do with the arrival of improved antibiotics. Indeed, as steadfast a pro-choice proponent
as Prof. Kristin Luker writes of the "irony" of abortion
reform: "Reformers were becoming more vocal about
the problems of criminal abortions at a time when
criminal abortion was probably becoming less lethal to
women."
Back to the key question: Why are there 1.6 million
abortions each year? Women abort for a whole host of
reasons. Many simply panic when they learn they are
pregnant. Others are not-so-subtlely coerced into abortion by boyfriends, husbands, welfare workers, friends,
siblings, and parents. Significantly, a large number of
women who have abortions-35 per cent and climbing-are repeaters. As any counselor who deals with
women who abort will tell you, many of these women's
lives are pure chaos. Getting pregnant and then getting an abortion are unfortunately part and parcel of
a life that happens to them rather than a life over
which they exercise control.
A careful reading of the literature of pro-choice organizations and individuals-both what is actually written and what exists between the lines-indicates that
even they agree that, in the words of pro-choice proponent Dr. Irvin Cushner, "the overwhelming majority
of abortions in this country are performed on women
who for various reasons do not wish to be pregnant at
this time." The point of this needs to be made explicit:
at the maximum, no more than l-3 per cent of abor8

tions are performed for the "hard cases"-situations of
rape, incest, or where the mother's life is at stake. As
we move deeper into our discussiion, the importance
of this poorly understood fact will become apparent.
It is increasingly clear that abortion as a "back-up"
to so-called "contraceptive failure" exerts an enormous
upward pressure on the numbers. One study in Family
Planning Perspectives (a journal affiliated with Planned
Parenthood) found that 45 per cent of abortion patients had not used contraceptives at any time in the
previous three to four months. The author concluded,
"In this study women had conflicting attitudes about
contraceptive use . . . . They perceived their personal
situation as inappropriate for bearing children but did
not take firm steps to prevent pregnancy."
Some of this ambivalence has to do with "testing
their fertility," or with a half-conscious effort to test a
man's feelings. If such "underlying factors" are not resolved, one or more abortions is common. Indeed,
Professor Luker, an articulate defender of abortion
and a former abortion-clinic counselor, concluded
after extensive research that a permissive abortion policy increases the number of abortions by increasing the
probability that couples will take contraceptive risk.
The risk-taking equation is skewed by the fact that
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women may subconsciously be denying to themselves
that they are increasing the likelihood of becoming
pregnant because they know that if they do, they can
always abort.
The law is a powerful teacher. As the public grows
more aware that legalization multiplies the numbers of
abortions by diminishing incentives to be sexually responsible, and that almost all abortions are performed
for social, not medical, reasons, its uneasiness will
steadily increase. Even if such facts in and of themselves do not move Americans from the mildly prochoice column to the mildly pro-life side, they may be
paving the way.
But until Roe is overturned, what can pro-lifers do
to (a) minimize the number of abortions and (b) set in
motion the machinery that would help women to cope
with unintended pregnancies? In fact, there are already two trends developing that will eventually· have
a major impact on the number of abortions and on attitudes towards the abortion problem. One operates
independently of pro-lifers, the other is a direct reflection of their efforts.
Both the women involved in crisis pregnancy situations and the public at large that is currently reluctant
to overturn the existing abortion policy by amendment
need to be shown that the unborn is one of us if they
are to change their minds. Once "prenatality" is seen
for what it is-just the first stage in the human continuum-the balance will turn dramatically against the
decision to abort.
I have already referred to a recent article by a man
who is unquestionably the preeminent pro-choice
apologist of the past twenty-five years, Daniel Callahan, director of the Hastings Center and author of
"How Technology is Reframing the Abortion Debate."
In weighing what Callahan has to say, we should not
simply notice his status; we should notice as well that
he still comes down against the pro-life position (although he concedes that his uneasiness has been
raised a "notch or two").
The second paragraph of Callahan's article deserves
to be quoted in full , because it succinctly summarizes
the thrust of his argument. "There has never been,"
he writes, "any straight line between medical or scientific knowledge and the public argument about abortion. Various types of information lend themselves to
varied moral , legal, and political uses. Is there any new
scientific information that could make a major difference in the abortion dispute? That seems unlikely, but
such a decisive event may not be necessary. The cumulative
impact of a number of otherwise limited scientific developments could also lead to a shift in public opinion,
moral thinking, and court decision." (Emphasis
added.)
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The implications of the new medical and scientific
developments are multiple and overlapping, according
to Callahan. For example, there are the scientific implications; breakthroughs may undermine factual assumptions pivotal in prior legal decisions. Then there
are psychological implications, either prompting
people to rethink their beliefs or increasing the likelihood of their reacting emotionally. Scientific developments may also have social implications in the sense of
placing abortion in a different social context. The
fourth implication is political: changes will work to add
weapons to one side or the other's polemical arsenal.
Finally, the advances may force people to search their
consciences, morally changing the correlation of forces.
Cumulatively, then, the scientific and medical advances are "personalizing" the unborn baby. Long the
invisible victim, the unborn baby now clamors for our
attention, a co-claimant on our sense of justice and
mercy. How could it be otherwise when we possess the
skill to operate in utero on the unborn, when technology enables mothers to "see" their babies via sonograms, when the same-age child aborted in one room
is the beneficiary of the entire panoply of fetal
medicine in another room? Inexorably, the preborn
have assumed the status of the "other patient" in a
pregnancy.
I would contend that the changes and developments
that I have outlined are bringing many Americans
who are now mildly pro-choice to the "tipping" point;
that is, it would not take very much more at all to turn
them around. Knowledge that most abortions are not
performed for the hard cases, that there is every
reason to believe that were it not routine to turn to
abortion many women would be less likely to have an
"unwanted" pregnancy, and that medical and scientific
advances are demonstrating beyond cavil that the unborn is one of us are uprooting the old ways Americans formerly understood what is at stake in the battle
over the lives of tens of millions of little ones.
But it remains true both for individual pregnant
women and particularly for a majority of the public
that even if this is all true, they still believe women
with untimely pregnancies virtually have no choice but
to abort. Where can they turn? To the alternatives-toabortion movement, the incredible growth of which is
sending a powerful message that pro-lifers deeply care
about pregnant women and are doing everything possible to provide the wherewithal to panicky women in
their time of need.
Although our research capacities are improving, we
still cannot say with certainty how many centers exist
to help women to bring their children to term and to
make a go of their lives afterwards. Best guesses are
that there are no fewer than 3,000 alternative centers
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in existence, while the real number may be well over
4,000, easily so if we include tollfree hotlines. And the
pace of expansion is picking up speed. One very conservative estimate is that at least one alternatives center
was opened up each day in 1984. That rate of increase
could double by 1987.
Provid ing "a better way" for pregnant women and
girls is a vital coefficient to the Pro-Life Movement's
political and educational thrusts. Sharing these
women's troubles has been the crucible in which our
devotion to both mother and child has been refined.
T hanks to its unselfishness, the alternatives wing of
the Movement has saved tens of thousands of little
babies' lives, assisted their mothers, and undermined
the cruel stereotypes of pro-lifers manufactured by
our opponents and perpetuated by the media.

Many moderate proponents of "abortion
reform" in the '60s merely envisioned
a little more leeway for doctors to
exercise their medical judgment over
a narrow range of "difficult cases."
As the alternative movement gathers more and
more press attention, the public is learning that such
helping centers provide everything from clothes for
mother and child, to pre-natal care, to the services of
obstetricians and pediatricians, even to a place to live.
Of late, more and more of the newer centers are becoming what amounts to mini-job-training centers to
teach these women the skills that will empower them
to pull their- and their babies'-lives together.
Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with my
evaluation, I trust that all will see that the abortion
issu e is like the great land masses. While to the untrained eye, little seems to change, except for an occational eruption like The Silent Scream, in fact there is
continual, ceaseless change going on beneath the surface. How can it be otherwise when the abortion debate, ultimately, is about that most social of all questions: Who is a member in full standing in the human
family? Or as Richard John Neuhaus has posed the
question, Who, then, is my neighbor?
Pro-lifers operate strategically at an enormous disadvantage. Our opposition boasts of a "simple, safe
twenty-minute solution" to a problem pregnancy.
Come in, they say, and we'll remove that troublesome
growth. By contrast, pro-lifers never pretend that
there are easy answers. Their solutions are always contingent, less than perfect, because people-and life itself- are not simple. Pro-lifers kid neither themselves
nor the women they strive to assist by pretending that
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once the baby is born, all will be smooth sailing. Many
times, making the right decision requires great character and courage. What pro-lifers can do is help demonstrate to women in distress that killing is never a
cure.
Thus, pro-lifers have many initial disadvantages. But
one advantage we have enjoyed in this most uneven
contest is a well-deserved reputation for nonviolence.
Those few who, for whatever reasons, now commit
acts of aggression against abortion clinics deplete our
Movement's primary resource: our moral authority to
condemn violence against defenseless preborn babies.
Violence is wrong tactically, strategically, and, most important, morally. It must not be allowed to sabotage
our Movement.
Let me conclude by borrowing a metaphor from
futurist Alvin Toffler. Talking of the nature of the
economic transformation taking place in our economy,
Toffler writes, "What is happening is not like a hurricane that sweeps across the landscape, leaving the
earth itself unchanged. It is more like the beginnings
of an earthquake. For the subterranean structure on
which our economics are based is now, itself, shifting,
cracking. In our efforts to prevent a major collapse,
we are dealing with surface phenomena rather than
focusing on the deep-structure, where the really big
changes are occurring."
One can see similar changes occurring in our attitudes towards abortion. Let me hasten to make clear,
however, that though I see a reversal of Roe as analogous to Toffler's hurricane, it is nonetheless essential
to rid ourselves of this terrible decision in order that
the fundamental changes rumbling deep within the
body politic will no longer be suppressed.
And those changes, as we have seen, stem from our
enhanced capacity to identify with the victim of abortion , from the uneasiness that flows from the knowledge that abortion is being used routinely as a form
of birth control, and from the sense that the indiscriminate use of abortion has simply gotten out of
hand. We should remember that many moderate
proponents of "abortion reform" in the 1960s and '70s
merely envisioned a little more leeway for doctors to
exercise their medical judgment over a narrow range
of "difficult cases." They did not at all foresee the horrors that abortion-on-demand has loosed.
Perhaps as enhanced technology allows us more
clearly to observe what Neuhaus has aptly called the
"ultimate immigrant," we shall more willingly answer
this little stranger's knock at our heart's door. I pray
this is true. In the meantime, as lightkeepers in a time
of great darkness, we keep the faith that the long
night that Roe v. Wade has brought upon us will someCl
day soon come to an end .
The Cresset

James D. Black

DOES A POEM MEAN?
The Limits of Subjectivity in Interpretation

My junior classes had just finished studying a unit
of about a dozen Emily Dickinson poems, and I was
looking for a sight-reading comparison assignment for
a quiz. I wanted an unfamiliar Dickinson poem, accessible to the students and thematically comparable to
her "To Make A Prairie," which the students had read
and apparently enjoyed. I selected "The Brain is
Wider Than the Sky." Easy enough, I thought-both
deal with the power of the human imagination, and
the students will see that. The assignment didn't work.
I'll not recount here the fantastic variety of grotesque
readings this assignment stimulated. Even more overwhelming to me than the mis-readings was the hostility
to my reading of the poem-and, of course, to the low
grades I assigned the students' papers. I attempted to
answer their antagonism with reason: "Explain to me
your readings," I suggested. "Where in the poem
do you find evidence to support your interpretations?"
"Don't poems mean what I want them to mean?"
(Somewhat reminiscient of the Queen of Hearts, I
thought to myself.) "Isn't it after all a matter of opinion? How can you say my ideas are wrong?" These
were the most civil of the responses, for the students
were incensed that anyone dare disagree with them,
and obviously I was not only tyrannical, but some sort
of academic vigilante. Moreover, they cited precedents
for their defense. Mrs. X or Mr. Y, who had been
their English teacher last year or the year before, had
told them-nay, taught them-that poems had no
"meaning," that interpretation was strictly (or loosely)
a matter of opinion.
Why is it that some English teachers teach their students that "Poetry means whatever you want it to
mean"? To me this is equivalent to saying "Poems have
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no meaning at all." We could make a case that Archibald MacLeish is the unwitting culprit. Certainly his
dictum, "A poem should not mean but be," has been
taken (or mistaken) to say that poems are essentially
meaningless creations anyway, so why bother to look
for any one generally accepted meaning?
Similarly, we could blame misreadings of Eliot. To
one unfamiliar with his idiom, his poems (and those of
his imitators) look like gibberish, and so they add
strength to the argument that poetry has no meaning.
To many readers, his inclusion of footnotes with The
Waste Land shows that the poem itself is meaninglesshis footnotes actually contain the "content" of the
poem (i.e., his interpretation); without the footnotes,
we are free to treat the poem as a verbal gestalt. (And
while we are abusing the innocent Eliot, let us not
forget Prufrock's words, "It is impossible to say just
what I mean!")
Among the more radical modern poets there may be
a few who write in a deliberately ambiguous fashion.
Some few seem to speak a private language, intelligible
only to themselves and perhaps two or three friends.
Certainly there are a number who write provisional
poems so badly in need of revision that they are capable of extremely varied interpretations. Diane
Wakowski comes to mind. I feel in many of her poems
a vagueness, a looseness, which makes for very tentative interpretations. Rightly or wrongly, I sense that
this looseness is less a calculated effect than it is an attribute of hasty and provisional composition.
Therefore, I strongly suspect that the answer to my
question of three paragraphs ago-"Why teach that
poetry means whatever one wants it to mean?"-does
not usually lie within the nature of the poems themselves, but in quite another place: in the teachers' own
inadequacies as readers of poetry. Whenever teachers
are incapable of an intelligent and coherent reading of
a poem, based strongly within the boundaries of the
poem itself, they feel that they can neither offer nor
expect from their students a strongly supported interpretation. Consequently, they allow incredible
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latitude in student analyses. More simply put, when
teachers don't know what they are doing, they become
pedagogical cowards and let their students get away
with saying anything they wish about the poem.
My point here is not to rule out reasonable variations in students' interpretations, and certainly not to
ignore connotative differences in perceptions of a
word or symbol. Rather, I'm trying to say that when
students (or teachers) read Frost's "Stopping by
Woods," they cannot be allowed to argue that it is really a poem about an Arab sheik in an oasis. The facts
of the poem in no wise support such a reading.
A more realistic situation has frequently arisen in
my classes when students engage in what I call
"tangential readings." Let me re-create one for you,
based on a composite of two quite similar student interpretations of the Frost poem (the word "tangential"
will define itself within the example). The word
"woods" reminds a student of some favorite retreat of
his own, where he went to sulk about the refusal of a
father to allow his daughter to date him. He then
imagines that the narrator of the poem has been forbidden by the landowner to see his daughter, but is on
his way to some tryst with the girl on the far side of
the lake, away from the father's prying eyes. The
scene is not really winter after all-the snow simply
symbolizes the dismal mood of the narrator. The repetition of "miles to go before I sleep" means that the
couple did meet and have sexual intercourse.
Hiding somewhere in this anecdote is a lesson about
reading. Too often students do not read poems-they
use them. To some the poem is a stimulus for whatever personal essays they choose to write at the moment. To others it is a way of exorcising that day's demons or seeking some personal redemption. To the
rest it is a crazed and cracked mirror, a way of seeing
and writing, not about the poem or the poet, but
about themselves. All these modes of writing have
their proper places in the classroom and out, but a response to a well-crafted poem should not be so wholly
or whimsically subjective.
I admit to a greater reluctance to prohibit the "mirror" reading than the others. The mirror metaphor is
deeply embedded in our critical tradition and vocabulary, and I agree with a host of poets and critics who
say that poetry should teach us something about ourselves. However, the mirror-reading I observe does
not accomplish so much as this, nor does it operate
very well. The mirror-readers I have in mind never
receive the poem at all. Rather, they submit the poem
to a hasty, inaccurate, partial reading and claim to find
in it visions of themselves. The poem remains a passive object virtually without character. In the very
worst cases it exists only as a hypothetical construct at
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the mercy of whimsy, egocentriCity, hordes of undisciplined emotions, or hormones.
As for the other mis-readers, they fail to find the
poem. Perhaps they are simply lazy, holding back and
not committing themselves to the poem. Perhaps they
lack the "mental furniture" that would equip them to
cope with the poem. Possibly they fear deceptions by
what they think are poets' games and thus they honor
neither poet nor poem. Whatever the cause, the effect
is to be denied admittance to an experience not already their own. They cannot climb out of themselves
into someone else's metaphor.

Too often students do not read poemsthey use them. To some the poem is
a stimulus for whatever personal
essays they choose to write at the
moment. To others it is a way of
exorcising that day's demons or
seeking some personal redemption.

To me, it's self-evident that most poems cannot be
stretched to mean anything one wants them to mean,
and that teachers who permit the sorts of readings recounted above have taught their students nothing
about the poem or about poetry. Rather than being
academic vigilantes, they have abdicated their responsibility to teach their students something about the
meaning of poetry. Certainly teachers can grant their
students some freedom of both intellectual and emotional response without granting them license to ignore the given poem in favor of some extraordinary
creation of their own making.
I am arguing for some uniformity in the reading of
poems, a uniformity I myself would not try to extend
to every word within a poem-I neither expect nor demand that clinically pure and antiseptic a reading. I
am arguing, however, that virtually all good and experienced readers of "Stopping by Woods" will agree
in the main on the meaning of the poem and that
their readings will include neither Arab sheiks nor illicit sex behind the barn. Unless the writer is being deliberately so obscure and ambiguous that no two readers agree, we must assume that the writer intended to
communicate, that he had a point of view, a thought
or image to communicate, and some sense of an audience.
On rare occasions we may allow that the writing of
a poem was somehow an extraordinarily personal
event, that the poet intended only to communicate
The Cresset

with some deep inner level within himself, for whatever reasons. However, the act of publishing a poem,
of sharing it, delivers a quite different message. It
means that the poet has put into the hands of a reader
a trust to be acted upon responsibly. To write otherwise is intentionally to broadcast static, and the poet
might as well hand the reader a dictionary or some
Scrabble tiles and say, "Here. You find the words you
want, then give them the meanings you want. After
all, it's your poem, and I had no part in its creation."
That's a statement I don't believe any true poet would
make.
Similarly I don't believe that a true teacher of literature would make such a statement, for it would signify a disbelief in the power of a poem to speak to
anyone, even its own creator. It would signify a failure
both to write and to read . We can fail in many ways,
as I did with the Dickinson unit: I took for granted
that my students could already read poetry; I was misled by the momentum imparted to class discussion by
the few who could properly read the assigned poems;
I had allowed myself to remain a reader, but I had
failed to teach. However, I can read poetry, and I believe I can teach it. Once I know how and why I fail,
I can overcome my errors.
But what about the teachers like Mrs. X and Mr. Y,
so numerous that they constitute not individuals, but
a species? Those who accept any answer in a language
approximating English because they themselves know
no better? I'm heading toward an obvious proposallet's have better training of our English teachers.
By "better" I mean more than additional credits in
education courses of dubious worth, and much more
than multiple-choice competency tests . Let's begin by
screening our applicants for their academic promise as
well as for their social skills and willingness to work
for a picayune salary. Let's have our prospective English teachers take first-rate, rigorous literature courses
requiring papers and oral demonstrations, preferably
taught in departments not dominated by so-called
"composition specialists." Let's require all of our
prospective English teachers to take a variety of period
courses, so as to learn both literary history and the
changing rhetorical and poetic idioms which come
with each generation.
Let's see that our prospective elementary school
teachers have to take real literature courses in addition
to the usual three to six hours of composition and a
quick survey of children's literature. The lower grades
are a wonderful place to capitalize on a child's inherent love of rhyme and rhythm , but certainly by the
later elementary or middle years, the content of literature units doesn't have to be barren of the easier
classics.
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I'd also like to see an immediate and radical change
in the attitudes of most college English departments.
The summer classes and seminars sponsored by
groups such as the National Endowment for the
Humanities are too rare. In addition to them , I'd like
to see numerous professors working closely with their
high school counterparts, designing and offering summer courses and institutes and year-round in-service in
worthwhile and challenging literature courses.
It's true that many school teachers are comfortable
with the worst of education courses-no content, no
term paper, and a true-false exam. But don't overlook
those who do want to immerse themselves again in a
rigorous literature course and who want to improve
their own skills as readers and critics and writers.
Those college English teachers who presently complain
about the quality of the students they face in freshman
or sophomore English can do more than wring their
hands or chuckle as they share their students' malapropisms-they can begin to treat their high schoool
counterparts as true colleagues and offer them expertise and support.
I'd also like to see college English teachers lobby
their state boards of education as strenuously as their
education school brethren do. For decades the
educationists have placed their own in positions of
political power and successfully lobbied for a proliferation of education requirements for prospective
teachers. They've been quite successful at getting
funding for repetitive in-service workshops in child
psychology, stress management, peer counseling, and
advanced audio-visual techniques. In short, the
educationists have monopolized the preparation and
recertification of classroom teachers while the academicians have allowed the erosion of the very
academic values and standards they profess to hold.
Theirs has been a naive error, an unwitting boycott.
"The wellsprings of language and literature and taste
bubble freely and endlessly," they have in effect said
to themselves. "They will renew themselves, no matter
how they are neglected." Not so, I fear, and the results
of several decades of shallow drafts have intoxicated
the brains on both sides of the desks in too many English classrooms.
It's a matter of belief, isn't it? A belief that good literature must engage as well as pacify. That a fineness
of mind and taste must be expected of our students,
and that bizarre and irresponsible readings cannot be
falsely validated in the name of fostering creativity or
in any other name. It's an article of faith that every
degree of intellectual freedom be accompanied by a
comparable measure of academic authority and rigor.
English teacher need not be vigilantes, but they do
need to be vigilant.
Cl
13

Debra Campbell

DOROTHY DAY AND THE
IMPERATIVE TO DISSENT
A Review Essay of Mel Piehl's Breaking Bread

From November 24 to December 8, 1985 representatives of the world's Catholic bishops met in Rome at
an extraordinary synod commemorating the twentieth
anniversary of the conclusion of Vatican II. The
months of preparation for the Synod were probably
more significant than the Synod itself, for they provided the opportunity for Catholics all over the world
to discuss publicly a question which has preoccupied
Catholics of the 1980s: has the Church progressed or
regressed since the Council?
Recent events in the American Catholic community
have underscored the urgency of the question. The
American bishops have issued letters on peace and the
economy which are highly critical of American
militarism and capitalism and appear, to some of their
coreligionists, to represent radical reinterpretations of
Catholic social teachings and the just-war theory.
Father Charles Curran of the Catholic University of
America has been asked to retract his public dissent
from the Church's official policy on sexual morality.
The Vatican censured the religious and lay people
(mostly women) who signed the advertisement which
appeared in the New York Times in October 1984 for
their claim that dissent from the Church's official position on abortion is permissible. Another advertisement has recently appeared, and Catholics await
Rome's reaction.
American Catholics approached the extraordinary
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synod with three mam issues m mind: the nature of
church authority, the role of the laity (especially
women) in church leadership, and the limits of social
activism within the Church. Reflecting upon the two
decades since Vatican II, they have sought new ways
to approach these three pivotal issues in the spirit of
the Council. This process was strikingly similar for
those on the right and the left flank of the Church,
for Catholics have become accustomed to explaining
(or justifying) their opinions on what is wrong or right
with the Church with vague, sweeping reference to
Vatican II.

Breaking Bread is a pioneering effort
in the field of early-twentiethcentury American Catholic history.
Without diminishing in any way the pivotal significance of the Council in modern church history, one
might suggest that it is time for American Catholics to
probe a little further back into their own inner history
so that they might understand better the situation in
the American Catholic Church on the eve of Vatican
II and reassess the Council's impact upon American
Catholicism.
Mel Piehl's Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker and
the Origin of Catholic Radicalism in America (Temple University Press, 1982) represents a pioneering attempt to
explore the neglected field of early-twentieth-century
American Catholic history. Piehl's book makes great
strides in the direction of the new American Catholic
historiography that veers away from institutional history and the biographies of bishops to survey the history of the laity and the increasingly complex network
of grassroots Catholic movements that emerged by the
middle of this century. Although Breaking Bread foThe Cresset

cuses upon the Catholic Workers, a tiny, decentralized
lay movement, its scope is strikingly broad, in large
part because the tiny movement remained on the vanguard of Catholic social, spiritual, and liturgical reform during the pivotal three decades prior to Vatican
II. Because the Catholic Workers struggled (and continue to struggle) to perfect their Christian witness in
the midst of the so-called secular world, from the
slums to the nuclear power plants, rather than retreating to the seclusion of the cloister or the groves of
academe, their history has remained deeply entangled
with that of the American Catholic Church at large.
In Breaking Bread Piehl not only locates the Catholic
Worker movement in its proper context in American
Catholic history, but he also suggests that the movement is part of the larger religious history of the
American people. The Catholic Workers start a new
chapter in the history of the American Social Gospel;
they represent a new phase in the history of American
utopian movements. In order to see how the Catholic
Workers fit into this larger picture of American religious life, a few words must be said concerning their
origins and development.
The Catholic Worker movement was born as a result
of the spiritual struggles of Dorothy Day, the central
figure in the movement from its founding in 1933
until her death in 1980. After a restless career as a
radical journalist for Call and The Masses, mingling
with the bohemians in Greenwich Village on the eve
of the First World War, Day, who had long been areligious seeker, converted to Catholicism. After years of
hesitation, Day was baptized in December 1927 shortly
after the birth (and baptism) of her only child, Tamar.
Motherhood itself was a religious experience for
Day. So that she might become the kind of mother she
wanted for her daughter she became a Catholic and,
in deference to the Church's opposition to socialism
and communism, she tried to abandon her long-held
political convictions. Working as a free-lance Catholic
journalist specializing in social and political affairs,
Day became deeply frustrated as she reported on the
actions of her former comrades while she herself was
unable to support them actively. Looking back upon
the first five years following her conversion she
lamented: "How little, how puny my work has been
since becoming a Catholic. .. . How self-centered, how
ingrown, how lacking a sense of community" (Day, The
Long Loneliness, p. 165).
This realization, a reflection upon her own personal
situation and upon the socially passive "pay, pray, and
obey" ethos of the American Catholic laity at the time,
became the stimulus for the founding of the Catholic
Worker movement. By 1933 Day had met the itinerant
French Catholic social activist Peter Maurin who
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helped her to discover the writings of Mounier, Maritain, and a whole spectrum of European Catholic intellectuals who wrote on social issues. Almost singlehandedly, Day launched the movement with the first
edition of a penny paper called The Catholic Worker,
which appeared in May 1933. The paper was intended
to popularize Catholic social teachings, especially
among workers and the poor.

Mel Piehl maintains that the ideals
of Dorothy Day's Catholic Worker
movement have given rise to a new,
distinctly American strain of
Catholic radicalism which continues
to influence the direction of the
Catholic Church in America.
Besides the paper, Day and Maurin saw the need
for urban outposts called Houses of Hospitality where
"Catholic Workers" dedicated to voluntary poverty
would provide intellectual and spiritual nourishment
as well as bread and soup and coffee for those in
need. Farming communes constituted a third, and
somewhat more peripheral, component of the movement. Thanks to the newspaper and Day's example,
Houses of Hospitality sprang up across the nation. In
1980, the year Day died, approximately 100,000
people subscribed to The Catholic Worker. Even in the
1980s, a decade in which communal living and voluntary poverty receive little attention from mainstream
American religious groups, the Catholic Workers'
Houses of Hospitality continue to serve the hungry
and the homeless across urban America.
In the spirit of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Workers, Mel Piehl chooses not to focus upon the achievements of the movement, but instead emphasizes the
ideals behind it. Piehl maintains that the ideals of the
Catholic Worker movement have given rise to a new,
distinctly American strain of Catholic radicalism which
continues to influence the direction of the Catholic
Church in America. Piehl explains that the American
environment offered a unique opportunity to the
Catholic Church. Because the Catholic Church was not
associated with the existing power structure and because Americans were not trained or inclined to listen
to the traditional Thomistic form of social discourse
developed in the European Catholic Church, American Catholics were free to formulate an entirely new
style of Catholic social thought.
This did not mean that the · Catholic Workers did
not build upon a European foundation, however. The
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personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, the distributism
of G. K. Chesterton and Vincent McNabb, and the religious philosophies of Fyodor Dostoevski and Nicholas
Berdyaev all combined to form the Catholic Worker
movement's distinctive social vision.
Following the lead of Day and Maurin, Catholic
Worker volunteers live lives of voluntary poverty as
expressions of solidarity with the poor and their total
commitment to the transformation of society. They
share their spartan meals and living quarters with all
comers for theological and sacramental as well as social
and practical reasons. The heart of the Catholic
Worker's vision shines through the following quotation
from Dorothy Day concerning why Catholic Workers
choose to share their meals (and their lives) with the
poor.

The disciples knew Christ in the breaking of bread . We
know Christ in each other in the breaking of bread. It is
the closest we ever come to each other, sitting down and
eating together.

One of Piehl's major contributions is his ability to
place this small movement in a larger context by showing how it fits into the larger history of the American
Social Gospel and of the religious utopian movements
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Piehl acknowledges the basic similarity between the goals of
the Social Gospellers and the Catholic Workers; both
sought to apply Christian principles to the process of
transforming society in the hopes of increasing justice
and freedom for all. Nevertheless, Piehl pays especially
close attention to the differences between the Catholic
Workers and the Social Gospellers and thereby underscores the uniqueness of the former movement.
While the Social Gospellers represented a vanguard
movement within the clerical leadership of the Protestant churches, the Catholic Workers arose from a grassroots movement composed of lower and middle class
Catholic lay people. Piehl maintains that the distance
which separated the Catholic Workers from the clergy
and hierarchy actually had a beneficial effect because
it left the movement "freer to take radical stands on
controverted issues without calculating institutional
consequences." While Social Gospellers like A. J.
Muste and Kirby Page became increasingly involved in
political rather than religious activism, the Catholic
Workers have remained a distinctly religious movement even as they apply a Christian critique to social
injustices. Finally, Piehl notes that while the Social
Gospel became a casualty of the theological crisis
which had occurred within American Protestantism by
the second decade of this century, the Catholic Workers benefitted from the "survival of Catholic inno16

cence" which made possible a consensus on matters of
faith and doctrine among American Catholics until the
second half of the twentieth century.
Piehl also suggests a connection between the Catholic Workers and experimental religious communities
such as the Oneida, Brook Farm, and Shaker communities that had their heyday in the nineteenth century. He maintains that in her youthful experiences
among the radicals in Greenwich Village, Day had
been influenced by the heirs of the nineteenth-century
utopians, and proceeded to transmit their spirit to the
Catholic Workers. Piehl recalls that like some
nineteenth-century utopians, the Catholic Workers
were not always successful in their effort to incorporate married couples into a communal movement.
Once again, Piehl ultimately emphasizes the differences between the earlier utopians and the Catholic
Workers rather than the similarities. For the Catholic
Workers, Piehl reminds us, were much closer to the
ideals and spirituality of the Franciscans and the Brethren of the Common Life than they were to the ideals
of Mother Ann Lee and John Humphrey Noyes.

One of Piehl's major contributions
is his ability to place this small
movement in a larger context by
showing how it fits into the larger
history of the Social Gospel and of
the religious utopian movements of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Scholars who look forward to the construction of an
increasingly interdenominational vision of American
religious history owe a considerable debt to Piehl, as
do those who hope to see the neglected fields of lay
history and twentieth-century American Catholic history further developed. Nevertheless, perhaps the
most haunting aspect of Breaking Bread is what it tells
us about the background to the discussions currently
underway within American Catholic circles concerning
church authority, the role of the laity and women, and
the limits of Catholic social protest and activism.
Although Day's personal piety and attitude toward
Catholic dogma clearly belonged to the pre-Vatican II
Catholic Church, she claimed the right to dissent from
the position of the hierarchy on social issues. Day supported striking gravediggers in New York City in 1949
despite Cardinal Spellman's public opposition to the
strike. In cities like Los Angeles, Boston, and Philadelphia, the movement survived without the local bishop's
help and support.
The Cresset

Piehl refers us to Day's advice to members of the
Los Angeles community in the early 1960s, when conflict between the Catholic Workers and the hierarchy
appeared imminent. Day told the Los Angeles Catholic
Workers not to try to seek support or approval for
their work, but instead to "follow where the spirit
leads." She urged them to "save [their] energies to
fight the gigantic injustices of our times, and not the
Church in the shape of its Cardinal Archbishop."
In the 1940s, when the American Catholic hierarchy
and the Church at large supported the Second World
War, Day stood almost alone in her pacifism. Only in
the Viet Nam era, when the American Catholic clergy
began to follow Day's lead, would Catholic pacifism
find itself on a solid footing in America. By following
her own advice to the Los Angeles Catholic Workers,
and confronting the issues rather than the authorities,
Day became a model of Catholic social dissent and
made others in her church aware that such dissent was
possible for Catholics. One should hastily add that
Day's position was feasible precisely because, for her,
church authority was not one of the issues.
Urging volunteers to avoid confrontations with the
hierarchy, Day chose to live her life within an alternative non-hierarchical community that was, in some
ways, closer to the vision she had shared with her radical friends in Greenwich Village than it was to that of
the American Catholic Community she had later
joined. As Piehl points out, the Catholic Workers conformed to the anarchist model, in which "all leadership was to be 'functional' rather than 'coercive."' Only
once, when she wanted Catholic Workers to unite on
the issue of pacifism in 1940, did Day attempt to lead
the movement heavy-handedly, and the resulting fragmentation within the movement showed how deeply
the anarchistic model had impressed itself upon the
Catholic Workers.
The Catholic Worker movement came into being because, even as a new convert, Day rejected the idea of
a passive laity that allowed the clergy to think for them
on social issues. As one of her friends explained: "She
loves [the Church] so much she feels she can criticize
it as an institution." Dorothy Day believed that because
Catholics were united in the Body of Christ, they had
no need to fear that dissent would bring disunity to
the Church at large. A twentieth-century prophet, Day
called the Catholic Church back to its true mission in
moments when she lamented "the scandal of businesslike priests, of collective wealth, the lack of a sense of
responsibility for the poor, the worker, the Negro, the
Mexican."
In his concluding chapter, Piehl admits that Day was
not equally sensitive to all issues. Although Day lived
until 1980, she never approved of the growing
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feminist movement within the church. Being a woman
in the Catholic Church did not pose a problem for
Day. Rather than aspiring to the priesthood, she
carved out her own niche in the Church, a niche Piehl
describes as a "homey" revolution in which the themes
of domesticity and community fused into a distinctive
form of Christian idealism.

In the bosom of the hierarchical
Catholic Church, Day nurtured an
anarchic, grassroots movement whose
goals, organization, and social
criticism strike at the heart of what
many Catholic feminists find most
offensive in traditional Catholicism.
In the bosom of the hierarchical Catholic Church,
Day nurtured an anarchic, grassroots movement whose
goals, organization, and social criticism strike at the
heart of what many Catholic feminists find most offensive about traditional Catholicism: its elitism, its pretensions, and its collaboration in the injustices that
afflict the world's oppressed peoples.
Piehl asserts that "the mere existence of an obviously
independent Catholic movement" like the Catholic
Workers "indicated that there were greater opportunities for innovation and diversity than most people
believed." This was true in 1933, and it remains true
in the Catholic Church in 1986. Although Day continued to accept the official Vatican pronouncements
on sexual morality and women's limited role in church
leadership for as long as she lived, one detects her
spirit-and perhaps even her influence-in the actions
of the signers of the two recent advertisements which
affirm Catholics' right to dissent from the Vatican's
stated position on abortion.
Day's long career in the Catholic Worker movement
testifies to the obligation to become an activist on social issues that trouble the conscience. Her movement
bears witness to the (actual and potential) pluralism
within the American Catholic community, and to the
possibility of a spectrum of Catholic opinions, even on
moral issues on which the Church has spoken unequivocally in the past. Day's public criticism of social
injustices both inside and outside of the church remains
her abiding message for American Catholics of the
1980s. As Breaking Bread makes abundantly clear, for
Dorothy Day and the Catholic Workers, loving the
church sometimes means having to say "no" to it, as
it is, so that it might be transformed into what it can
become.
Cl
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Macho Theology
Richard Lee
"I wouldn't want a guy to be so
in touch with his feelings that he'd
go to pieces when I needed him, "
allows one student. Another agrees,
"Sure, better a macho than a
wimp." Laughter. A third hopes
her husband will "first make all the
money we'd ever need" and "then
be sensitive-at least to me. " Giggles. Still another thinks maybe
some males can be tough and tender at the same time and "well, you
know, like liberated hunks ." Whistles. "Feminist!" hisses the first student. "Try and find one," sighs the
second student. Hoots.
This snatch of conversation, with
much of the humor, was not unlike
others one hears on campus today
among students preoccupied with
the changing relationships between
the sexes. I remain puzzled by the
hardened categories of those conversations, both male and female ,
but this particular conversation of
coeds put me more in mind of
another sexual relationship changing at this time. I am not sure I
discern it aright, and certainly my
expression is feeble, but for want
of better words in a short space I
will call that changing sexual relationship macho theology.
It goes without saying that God is

Richard Lee is a former Editor of
The Cresset.
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metaphorically male in Western
religion, but it is not always clear
how the maleness of God is imagined at any particular time. The
imagination of that maleness, however, does change over time, and
some of the changes slip out in
popular preaching and piety. My
unscientific sample suggests that
parts of popular Christianity are
taking a markedly macho turn at
the moment, and that projection of
machismo onto the maleness of
God reflects one of the tougher
idols of our time.
First, macho theology means imagining a god heavy on plans for
everybody, including himself. The
macho god is like the hard-driving
coronary Type A male preoccupied
with controlling his world and
everyone in it. Evangelists crusading among college students today
elaborately elaborate "God's PLAN
For Your Life," and the charm of
this god is you can avoid intolerable surprises for him now and for
yourself later-if you discern the
details of his plan for your life in
time. It is not a theology utterly
fearing divine grace and human responsibility, but a response to a
plan instead of a person slips
quickly into manipulating others as
well as yourself. The macho Christian strangely finds that his god's
plan for his life must be the very
plan for everybody's life. Christianity then becomes a forced march.
Second, macho theology means
imagining a god heavy on impossible demands and overreaching
judgments. Such a theology glories
in his demands for holiness from
the flawed and for perfection from
the finite . Joined to his impossible
demands are his awesome judgments beyond anyone's bearing or
deserving. You may be poor,
weary, sick, suffering, and wracked
by your humanity, but the macho
god relativizes your troubles with
the assurance that things are much
worse than you think. You are also

condemned to everlasting perdition. The charm of this god is that
you apparently derive a certain holiness and perfection when you
identify with him and start making
his hardest demands upon otherswhile strangely no longer standing
under them yourself. Christianity
then becomes the gang of the bully.
Third, macho theology means
imagining a god heavy on power.
As one wealthy TV preacher reports his market research, "We determined that people weren't interested in religion or church, but
they were interested in God's
power." Idols follow hard upon our
interests, and we are, as a people,
apparently most interested in the
power of performance. More than
one electronic evangelist who
would blanch at preaching the
macho potencies of sex and VIOlence readily preach a macho god
empowering you for what remains-money. While this theology
rarely reduces to the taunt "If
you're so Christian, why aren't you
rich?" it generally teaches that one
of the unambiguous demonstrations of divine power in the world
is the almost sacramental increase
of wealth. Christianity then becomes the sweet smell of success.
If, as I suspect, projecting
machismo onto the maleness of
God reflects some deeply felt anxieties of our time, the macho god
will not be an easy idol to cleanse.
Like any idol he may be exposed
by the biblical tradition and exorcized by a better faith, but he will
likely linger a little longer in the
imagination. My guess is that routing him out of the imagination lies
in laughter like the laughter I
heard in that conversation of coeds.
They could not speak in hardened
categories about males without partially transcending those imagined
categories with some healthy laughter. The imagined macho god
would run from any equally
healthy sense of the ridiculous. Cl
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In Praise of a
Modest Preface
Richard Maxwell
After seeing the movie Out of Africa, I found my copy of Isak Dinesen's book on a high shelf. The
book had been sitting there for
some years. It contained a clipping
from Time. I once lavished considerable effort on cutting up Time
and filing away reviews or squibs, a
habit which I do not propose that
anyone else imitate. However, it
was a useful custom in its way.
There are bits of the late 1950s
and early Sixties hidden all
through my library. They function
like Baroque still-lives with skulls
and burning candles, emblems of
mortal vanity.
This particular clipping was a
fine example. An anonymous reviewer-Time was then anon ymous--chose the publication of Dinesen's Shadows in the Grass, her
second Africa memoir (published
in 1961 but written decades earlier)
as an occasion to sketch the author's character. "Mau-Mauism is a
tragedy that grieves and baffles
Isak Dinesen, but belief in the
noble savage is something of a family heritage." "Apart from fruit, her
only nourishment is oysters and
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champagne." "Dinesen, 75, has
spent the 27 years of her writing
life routing the brute realities of
the 20th century from her prose."
Each of these sentences deserves
its own essay-length commentary,
which I will refrain from giving.
Taken together they suggest why
Isak Dinesen was able to sell her
books through the Book-of-theMonth club, to attract photographers and reporters, and finally to
become an American celebrity.
We should remember that one
other career along these lines was
being made in the same years. As
William Pritchard has recently
pointed out, Robert Frost published his last substantial book of
verse in 1942. Frost spent the rest
of his life cultivating his image as
an icon of New England folksiness .
He got his picture taken, consulted
with Khrushchev about peace, etc.
Aside from occasional appalling efforts or appalling occasional efforts
(e.g. the piece for Kennedy's inauguration) he did not write much
poetry.
Dinesen pulled off an equivalent
stunt; where Frost played Canny
Yankee, she played Old World Aristocrat. Others have since attempted this role but no one has
matched Dinesen's splendid effort.
Bring out the oysters and champagne! Here comes the withered
grande
dame
banishing
brute
realities from her prose, longing
still for feudal Kenya where exiled
aristocrats and noble savages once
played together-before the vulgar
middle classes arrived , causing the
noble savages to become MauMaus. The vulgar middle classes
loved Dinesen's act. No less than
Frost, she performed a crucial cultural task, embodying an ethos
which no one was about to embrace
but which made, nonetheless, a
compelling fantasy .
This fantasy-for which, I regret
to say, we must hold Dinesen as
well as Time responsible--can easily

poison a reading of her works . The
difference between the caricature
and Dinesen's best writing can be
suggested by an anecdote, a sort of
fable, that occurs towards the end
of Out of Africa. After a long stay in
Kenya, Dinesen (then Karen Blixen) was on the point of losing her
coffee farm. While she was facing
this crisis, her lover, Denys FinchHatton, died in a plane crash. A
week after his death, she "came out
of the house looking for a sign"
and witnessed (she says) an extraordinary incident. A white cock appeared from one side of the path,
a chameleon from the other. The
chameleon "was frightened, but he
was at the same time very brave";
he "shot out his tongue at the
cock," the most formidable thing
he could do, whereupon the cock
plucked his tongue out whole. Subsequently Dinesen killed the chameleon, which could not of course
have survived.

Bring out the oysters
and champagne! Here
comes the withered

grande dame banishing
brute realities from
her prose and longing
still for feudal Kenya.
Robert Langbaum, author of a
good book on Dinesen, compares
this story to the Book of Job; the
sufferer asks for an explanation of
suffering and gets (instead) a demonstration of sublimity. Like Job,
Dinesen is reminded that she does
not live in a comfortable universe.
One might add, she is afforded a
mordant consolation, a reminder
that God has at least not torn out
her tongue. (She will need it when
she tells her tales; tale-telling is to
be her vocation, so long as the cock
forbears .) The story is thus horrible
and also a little bit funny; it
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suggests that Divinity has a peculiar
sense of humor, at least from a
human viewpoint.
Dinesen's tales are effective because they communicate such perceptions in an unfailingly vivid
manner. At her best she is implacable, detached, ironic, and passionate, a rare combination. Perhaps we
could speak of her temperament as
aristocratic but only if the sort of
aristocrat we have in mind is Hamlet. Oysters and champagne are beside the point, as is the drivel about
banishing "brute realities."
Now the dilemma. What is the
cinematic biographer to do? He
does not want to get involved with
Dinesen the poseur, the pseudo-aristocrat-but neither, if he is making
a big, middlebrow movie, can he
dwell too long with Dinesen the
tragicomic fabulist. There is a third
alternative which I have thus far ignored, which might seem the obvious solution. However, I think I
would reject out of hand the proposal that our biographer focus on
the "historical" Isak Dinesen. The
facts of the case are elusive enough
even to determined pursuers like
Hannah Arendt (see her Men in
Dark Times for a shrewd but finally
puzzled essay on Dinesen's extraordinary life in Africa and after:
Arendt points out, for example,
that Dinesen's relatives in Denmark
supported for many years the folly
of her Kenyan coffee farm-then
leaves us to puzzle over how we
should understand such a subsidy.)
This appears to take care of all
the options; fortunately it turns out
that there is one other. Working
from hints in the book Out of Africa
and from biographical material that
has appeared since Dinesen's death,
Sydney Pollack neither perpetuates
an infatuation with celebrity, nor
tries to make Dinesen into one of
her own characters, nor becomes
too obsessed with chasing history.
Out of Africa has the magic of a
guess: that is, of an hypothesis that
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In Out of Africa
things tend to wander.
Events are (apparently)
foreshadowed, then never
come to pass. I have
seldom seen a film so
full of minor dead-ends.
In its bare outlines, the story told
by the film goes like this: young
Karen Dinesen marries Baron Blixen, the twin brother of a man with
whom she has had a disastrous affair; they go to Kenya a few years
before World War I; they run a
coffee plantation but the plantation
is too high for the coffee to grow
well and Karen does all the work
while her husband philanders or
(come the war) fights; Karen contracts syphilis from Baron Blixen
and goes back to Europe to be
treated; on her return she has her
affair with Finch-Hatton; after an
idyllic period, the plantation finally
fails; Finch-Hatton dies when his
beloved plane crashes; Karen arranges for the local tribe (the Kikuyu) to remain on their land; Karen
leaves Africa forever; returning to
Europe, she becomes Isak Dinesen
the author.
This plot, if it is one, is not replete with elegant structural devices. There is one small effort at
framing the story: when Karen first
comes to Kenya, she wanders into a
male-only bar at a British club and
is expelled; when she leaves, she is
invited into the club for a drink.
For the most part, however, events
tend to wander. Characters are introduced with fanfares, then fail to
be developed or used. Events are
(apparently) foreshadowed, then
never come to pass. I have seldom
seen a film so full of minor deadends. Nothing could be further

from the cruel and seductive recursiveness of Dinesen's own stories
within stories.
At one point, Karen entertains
Finch-Hatton and his friend Berkeley Cole with a long, Scheherezadestyle tale built up from random bits
suggested by her auditors. We hear
the very beginning of the tale and
the last sentence. The filmmakers
do not even pretend to imagine
what came between. Their own
narrative ambitions are drastically
different from Karen's, a fact
which 1s signalled here and
throughout.
If there is a structural center to
the movie Out of Africa it would
have to be Karen Blixen's affair
with Denys Finch-Hatton. Pollack
and his associates devote more attention to this episode than to any
other. Their treatment of it is curious and affecting. In the book we
are left to infer that an affair is
going on; a major Hollywood film
has no such choice.
Pollack takes a chance by casting
Meryl Streep as Karen Blixen
against Robert Redford as Denys
Finch-Hatton. We know what is
going to happen. Streep will do a
pretty good Danish accent. She will
be generally convincing as an earlytwentieth-century European. Redford will be Redford. There are reviewer's jokes about Robert Redford's limited acting powers going
back to the very beginning of his
career. Gene Siskel, among others,
has kept the tradition up: he recently announced that Redford's
presence spoiled Out of Africa.
However, Siskel should consider
the options. Suppose that Streep
was cast against the perfect British
upper-class twit: Jeremy Irons, let
us say. Out of Africa then becomes
one more exercise in the silliest
variety of Anglophilia. Is Siskel
willing to face the horrible prospect
of Jeremy Irons in Kenya, keeping
a stiff upper lip? And accompanied
by a faithful native companion?
The Cresset

And cou rting Meryl Streep? And
taking her on lion hunts? Surely
these questions answer themselves.
We can get enough of the British
Empire by watching PBS.
Moreover, Redford doesn't need
to do much. There is a kind of
eerie magnificence in his not even
trying for a British accent. He just
stands there, smiles, exhibits his
well-preserved or perhaps well-reconstructed visage. He is an icon.
He glows a little, an inexplicable
freak in this historical-cultural context. And the movie is thus able to
take brilliant advantage of him.

Robert Redford doesn't
need to do much. There
is a kind of eerie
magnificence in his
not even trying for a
British accent.
So accidental does Redford seem,
he never loses his mystery. We
think a little about the wonders of
Hollywood casting. We think a little
more about the wonders of Denys
Finch-Hatton, who becomes an appropriate figure of love, compelling
because impossible. Planned or not,
the disparity of style between
Streep and Redford is one of Out of
Africa's great successes.
There are others. Klaus Brandauer, this decade's best sleek villain ,
makes much of his small role as
Baron Blixen; Dinesen's memoirs
say little about the erring husband,
but once her love affair is made
central we need someone like Brandauer on hand: someone, that is, as
smart and sexy as Redford but
fickle by his very nature. Brandauer fu lfills this function admirably, withou t-a real danger-taking
over the fil m and reducing it to the
story of a nasty little triangle.
The relations between Karen Blixen and the Kikuyu are also well-
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handled, largely because Pollack
doesn't try to do too much with
them. Arendt has pointed out the
elaborate methods of self-deception
on which Dinesen relied during her
African sojourn, and by which she
established her (supposedly) lordly
relation to all around her. Pollack's
film steps back from these fables,
neither denying nor affirming
them: the Kikuyu are presented as
people living apart, friendly to Dinesen, sometimes (as she admits)
condescending, in several cases
loyal servants-for the most part,
however, just different. And here
Pollack leaves the matter.
The landscapes of Out of Africa
are treated with something of this
same tact. It is usually considered a
put-down to praise photographed
scenery in narrative film (as though
there weren't anything else to
praise), but the scenery is essential
here and it could have been a difficulty. A character of the poet
Stevie Smith responds to a marriage proposal with the words, "I
am not a cold woman, Henry,/But
I do not feel for you,/What I feel
for the elephants and miasmas/And
the general view." The general
view can dwarf a love story--or
worse yet, become the cliched back-

drop to human passions.
Neither fate befalls the sequence
in Out of Africa where Streep and
Redford fly over the Kenyan landscape. Dinesen writes that flying
"opens up a world": more precisely
a third dimension of movement.
She praises the spectacles she saw
from the air, "the rainbow on the
green sunlit land, the gigantic upright clouds and big wild black
storms, [which] all swing around
you in a race and a dance ," but she
praises more the flier's relation to
these things. The movie manages
to photograph this relation.
There is a particularly fine moment when the camera passes over
a flock of flamingoes and they scatter-a motif familiar from several
thousand African documentaries,
but we are allowed to feel the tension suggested by Dinesen's words:
"At our approach they spread out
in large circles and fans, like the
rays of a setting sun, like an artful
Chinese pattern on silk or porcelain, forming itself and changing,
as we looked at it." The plane both
reveals and causes the pattern. The
beauty is in the disruption but then
the disruption passes too. Here, as
perhaps nowhere else in this film,
photography can do something to
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match Dinesen's words-and the
opportunity is taken.
I have tried to note the danger
spots. If Out of Africa were going to
lurch towards celebrity-adoration,
fake artiness, or the biographer's
losing struggle with facts, it would
be in one of these places: the plotting, the portrayal of Finch-Hatton,
the stunt of hiring Brandauer, the
depiction of the Kikuyu, or the nature-worship. In practice, we get
past all these facets without feeling
either manipulated or let down.
The movie even lays claim to its
own cockeyed, blundering romanticism-quite different from the
romanticism Arendt found in
Karen Blixen's life, from anything
in the art of Isak Dinesen (stoicism,
elegance, egocentricity mocking itself), or from anything, thank
heaven, in her celebrity.
More power to Sydney Pollack.
His modesty is quite different from
mediocrity. Out of Africa strikes me,
finally, as a good deal like a preface . By its nature it must remain a
subordinate work. Far from attempting to disguise this status, it
tries to be the best preface it can
be: an evocation at a distance on a
crucial period in the life of a great
writer. The moviegoer who has
never read Dinesen might next
turn to the book Out of Africa-or
better yet, to Seven Gothic Tales,
whose introductory story, "The Deluge at Norderney," is almost a
microcosm of her artistic accomplishment. If we think of the
central character in Pollack's Out of
Africa as having written "The Deluge at Norderney," we will understand it a little better-and we will
also see that our work is just beginnmg.
The movie, then, has done us a
considerable service, but has not
pretended to accomplish more than
it can. In her better moods, anyway, Dinesen would have appreciated such detachment m the
midst of such lavishness.
~~
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The Usual
Suspects
James Combs
Once under a time, in a place
called Hollywood, a man named
Claude Rains stood in the phony
fog and rain on a Warner Brothers
studio set and said, "Round up the
usual suspects." Much later, this
line would serve as the inspiration
for movie critic David Thompson's
delightful book, Suspects, in which
he takes some of Hollywood's more
memorable characters and builds
them a life off-screen, indeed a life
of relations with each other, as if
they were real human beings.
Thompson makes Bedford Falls
(Capra's prototype American town
of It's A Wonderful Life) the spiritual
center of the country, but interlaces
the characters in a web of complex
relations that aims at nothing less
than understanding movie-made
America.
They are all there, the suspects:
the corrupt and aged man of
wealth and power (Noah Cross of
Chinatown), the effete and urbane
culture snob (Waldo Lydeker of
Laura), the ruined but pathetic girl
of the streets (Debby Marsh of The
Big Heat), the charming madman
(Bruno Anthony of Strangers on a
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Train), the doting Oedipal mama
(Ma Jarrett of White Heat), the cunning European gourmand (Casper
Gutman of The Maltese Falcon), the
cynical screenwriter who could
have written The Great American
Qoe
Gillis
of Sunset
Novel
Boulevard), the walking time bomb
(Travis Bickle of Taxi Driver).
Thompson fills in the blanks for
us, but we suspected it all along.
We always knew why Rick Blaine
could not return to America, knew
about Norman Bates' troubled and
lonely childhood, what eventually
happened to Kay Corleone, why
Mary Francis Bailey made such a
wonderful wife. We knew it all
along: we have met the suspects,
and they are us.

We always knew why
Rick Blaine couldn't
come home and about
Norman Bates' childhood.
Popular culture's grip on our
dream life is rooted not just in
stories. The fundamental human
impulse, "Tell us a story," is always
augmented by "Who's in it? What
are they like?" We crave not just
narratives, but also characters.
Characters give human shape to
stories, and they linger in our
memory as the figures who embody
things. Stories tell us what kind of
world we live in, but characters tell
us who occupies that world.
Novelists have always understood
the importance of character development. Our recollection of
plots may be hazy, but a powerfully
drawn character lingers as an identifiable figure. I have forgotten
much of the plot of David Copperfield, but I can never forget
Micawber.
Classic Hollywood understood
the thirst for characters. The stars,
of course, were typecast, essentially
playing the same role over and
The Cresset

over again. The great stars'
achievement was in a sense the creation of their own character. John
Wayne played John Wayne, Bette
Davis played Bette Davis, and so
on. (Archibald Leach, the man who
played "Cary Grant," once said, "I
wish I could be Cary Grant.") They
would give them Oscars when they
didn't play themselves, thinking
that they were acting for the first
time (cf. Bogart for The African
Queen, Wayne for True Grit; Grant
tried the same ploy with Father
Goose, but didn't succeed).
Then there were the people they
called "character actors" (Lionel
Barrymore, Guy Kibbie, Valparaiso's own Beulah Bondi). I remember nothing of the plots (such
as they were) of the B-Westerns I
watched as a kid , but I'll always remember the character of Gabby
Hayes. Hollywood should award a
special Oscar to the character of
Gabby Hayes.
Our fascination with fictional
characters is no secret, but what
they do for us is a little harder to
fathom. Essentially, the characters
of popular culture are icons, popular representations of social meanings as embodied in an archetypical
being. A human icon is thought to
personify certain attributes representative of actions typical to a role
or a society.
American male heroism, as represented by Hollywood icons, still
has a lot of John Wayne (with
Eastwood and Stallone, in degenerate form) in it, and that scares a lot
of the world; but there is also a lot
of Jimmy Stewart there too, a
somewhat more compromising and
sociable figure whose humility and
good sense grows into social leadership. On the other hand , as Russell
Baker wrote awhile back, maybe we
are still missing Spencer Tracy, the
icon of civilized integrity.
In any case, television has been
around long enough for us to have
acquired a whole additional stock
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of memorable characters, Icons
which reveal a great deal about
ourselves and our expectations.
Let us think of a few. One of the
enduring icons of TV was Lucille
Ball's creation of "Lucy Ricardo."
Feminists may rail at her starstruck
idiocies, the Dizzy Redhead bawling
because she doesn't get what she
wants, her essential dumb female
act; but she goes on forever as the
archetype of the Housewife's Misadventures (which included, recall,
an astonishing number of times
that she and Ethel broke the law,
for instance breaking and entering
movie stars' homes). If she taught
that women are untrustworthy children, she did it with such comic
verve that she created an enduring
character of iconic fascination.
Much later, of course, the character
of "Mary Richards" would communicate very different characterological traits, becoming an icon
befitting the 1970s.

What Ralph Kramden
and Archie Bunker have
in common is their own
powerlessness, both in
the politics of their
country and in the
politics of their home.
Who are the female icons of the
1980s? Madonna? Or perhaps Joan
Collins, an aging but well-preserved
imperial goddess whose values are
limited to wealth, power, and pleasure and who prides herself on the
thoroughness of her Machiavellianism. In Jungian terms, perhaps
Collins is the "shadow self' Bad
Girl in black velvet and diamonds
to Linda Evans' more bosomy and
maternal Good Girl, symbolizing a
split in the female psyche.
There have been some significant
male TV icons-Joe Friday, Jim
Anderson, Mr. Spock, Lou Grant,
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R. Ewing. One of the more interesting creations was Jackie
Gleason's "Ralph Kramden," a kind
of Brooklyn Everyman mired in
the meanness of lower-middle-class
deprivation and marital discord,
but buoyed by constant schemes to
break out of his grim existence or
constant threats to beat his wife.
Such a character is perfect for high
domestic comedy, satirizing both
the loud-mouthed male fears of the
McCarthy era and the sense of
frustration of those the Eisenhower
prosperity passed by.
But, true to his time, Ralph's
political consciousness is confined
to intrigues in the International
Order of Friendly Raccoons. The
later TV character most similar to
Kramden, Archie Bunker, is as
politicized as Ralph is not; but then
Norman Lear and the ethos of the
1970s called for different icons.
What Ralph and Archie have in
common is their ow.n powerlessness, both in the politics of their
country and the politics of their
home. For different times, Ralph
and Archie represented a common
theme, discussed by psychologist
Geoffrey Gorer in his study The
American People by reference to
Dagwood Bumstead. Gorer was
struck by the extent to which the
power of American males to control their own fate has been abrogated not only in the world of work
but also at home. How awfully and
bitterly funny that is.
We may also ask of the other
gender: who are the male icons of
the 1980s? Michael J. Fox? Prince?
Sticking to the imperial opulence of
Dynasty, how about John Forsyth?
His rendering of "Blake Carrington" has iconic proportions, as
an aged but erect dynast determined to control his own fate in a
work-world and home-world gone
mad. The only icon of the Eighties
who seems to approach Blake's
powerful stance is Jane Wyman's
"Angela Channing" of Falconcrest,
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whose former husband, a movie
icon of the Forties, went on to play
in a long-running version of Mr.
Smith Goes to Washington. But as if
by contrast, the ruthless Angela, as
played by the adroit Wyman, is no
Mrs. Nice Lady; one can 1magme
the ruler of Falconcrest bending
Gorbachev into a pretzel.

When Mike Royko called
Ronald Reagan "the Ted
Baxter of politics" we
knew just what he meant.
Carl Jung thought that such
mythological images were projections of the "collective unconscious," persistent if altered archetypes that are somehow deeply
embedded in our cultural, and
more inclusively our species, memory. This claim has been much disputed, but it is fair to say that icons
correspond to widespread experience. The icons of the horror film
could not exist without the nightmares of childhood. The image of
the Bad Mother could not be sustained in popular culture without
our primordial fear of maternal
abandonment.
In previous ages, icons often
were embedded in religion, and
many critics of popular culture
have argued that popular icons are
degraded
forms
of religious
iconography. (The Madonna of the
Eighties is very different, in form
and function, from the Madonna
of medieval Catholicism, perhaps
the ultimate distinction between the
virgin and the dynamo.) But maybe
our popular icons are just different, a new form of worship. Jewett
and Lawrence, in their book The
American Monomyth, argue that "religion may have merely changed its
theater and neglected to place its
name on the marquee. The move
from the cathedral to the tube,
screen, or stereo offers the faithful
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many of the values sought in traditional religion."
Mircea Eliade said that the figures of our amusements serve the
same "magico-religious" functions
as the totems of primitive man: "It
seems that a myth itself never disappears . . . It only changes its aspect and disguises its operation."
Saints and sinners, the weak and
the powerful, Jeckylls and Hydes,
the heroic and the pathetic, the
beautiful and the ugly, the old and
the young-the parade of our
popular icons is richer than a
medieval pageant, if somewhat less
dignified. Perhaps they are figures
of magic, if we mean by that the
ability to manipulate a world with
its own laws and narrative order.
Perhaps they do represent something of the decay of religious belief into forms of popular religiosity. The icons of popular drama
only flourish, to paraphrase Yeats,
in the neighborhood of their
shrines, and one of those shrines is
The Tube.
An anthropologist named John
Caughey has studied our "artificial
social relations" and has concluded
that "most Americans probably
spend more time in artificial interactions than they do in real
ones." We know hundreds of pop
characters, who occupy a world of
vicarious social experience. There
are people who talk to TV characters, think they have special relationships to them, think that
somehow they have entry to a
phantasmagorical spirit world. Our
icons are figures of comparison
and contrast, even Platonic models
of emulation.
When Mike Royko called Ronald
Reagan "the Ted Baxter of politics"
we knew immediately what he
meant; when women compare
someone they know to Alexis
Colby, we understand; when girls
dress like Madonna, we know why.
Artificial social relations put us in
touch with a world of characters

worth knowing, give us the grace
or the grit of an iconic being, let us
play among the gods. We may be
becoming a psychotic society in
consequence, but it must be said
that at least we have a rich fantasy
life.
So let us now praise famous
icons. We can open the window of
our iconographic house, and let
our spirits talk among themselves.
So round up the usual suspects.
Come on in, Ralph and Archie,
have a seat over there next to Blake
and Krystle. Sit down, Angela, and
talk some sense to Lucy and Mary.
Is that J.R. over there talking with
Noah Cross? Looks like Alexis is
putting the make on Casper Gutman. I wonder if Bruno Anthony is
coming; he's such the life of a
party. Is Clint Eastwood bringing
Madonna? Why is Norman Bates
talking so intently with Ma Jarrett?
What's that Travis Bickle said just
now? Are you speaking to me? Cl

Days of Nature
Only the living
dwell on death
Eurydice, had she come back
would not have mentioned
ever, the sudden dark
nor the grey that followed it
the centurion's son went on
his ordinary way
dumb to his father's tale
of a miracle
nor would Lot's wife have told
how fresh salt feels.
Dully the peaches drop
to the noisy hymning of bees.

Jean Hollander
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Anthology Blues
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
Let me warn you that what follows is petulant, cranky, ungrateful,
and yet overwhelmingly persuasive.
I have lately been looking closely at
the anthology of British and American poetry I'll use next fall.
As these things go, it's a good
book, better than the one I 9lose
last time, which turned out worse
than the one used several times before. But it's far from perfect, and
by now the perfect teaching anthology ought to exist.
The chief defect of this new
book, copyright 1986, is that it endorses (like many textbooks) three
North American absurdities:
1. Smatterings. The world is
full of available things, and Americans, ignorant of everything at age
17, ought to get at a whole lot of
them.
2. Knowledge is essentially a
matter of information, in little disconnected bits.
3. The more accessories the better.
On the first of these points you
have already, some time ago, heard
my intransigence. Most people

Charles Vandersee, at the University
of Virginia, is sending out a last call
for letters of Henry Adams before publication of those of 1892-1918 in 1987.
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should not attempt to study poetry,
or buy Swiss watches in kits to assemble, and they should not feel
guilty for their protean deficiency.
Don't rejoice, for heaven's sake,
and don't scorn the savant, but
don't feel guilty. Poets themselves,
self-appointed prophets and legislators, are ignorant, often, of the
world's physical operations-fission,
fusion, plate tectonics, optics, stock
tickers, micro and macro Sturm und
Drang of all kinds-and do not
apologize. They are often poor
psychologists, slovenly caretakers of
the bodily temple, and so forth.
Their talents are for emotion and
insight and language, so that they
would not confuse hyperbole (this
paragraph)
with
synecdoche,
though they might mistake a Mercedes SSK for a Duesenberg.
Ordinary people, who perhaps
know how to pick clothes that
match, save money for a rainy day,
and drive home sober from a long
party, should not worry if the
name Berryman means nothing to
them, or Plath, or Sexton, or
Crane, or Jarrell, or even Sidney or
Blake (William, not Eubie) or Herbert (George, not Frank) or even
. . . Wordsworth or Keats or
Browning.
It's a sin of omission only if an
American aged twenty has not read
two poems: the one beginning
"Had we but world enough, and
time," and the one ending "About
the woodlands I will go I To see
the cherry hung with snow." These
are the Law and the Prophets:
woman as sex object, spring as
beautiful and necessary, time and
human works always vanishing, self
(not God or the quartz clock) as
final measure. All poems are variations on these--even poems to
God measure the kind and amount
of God needed.
Do not worry about The Waste
Land and "The Rape of the Lock,"
and be ignorant completely rather
than think the ironies of "Richard

Cory" or "Ozymandias" remain
luminous. Many poems · and poets,
even in anthologies, are not as durable or admirable as marble monuments, despite what poems condescendingly say about stonework.
But suppose you do pick up an
anthology. At the nadir of virtually
every page, footnotes appear.
Seven times, on pages 110, 224,
268, 332, 455, 574, and 895, Orpheus is identified. You will find
"scud" defined on page 557, "scudding" on page 386, and "scudded"
on page 361. Not kidding. Thebes
four separate times, and also the
word "darkling."
Editors may say, full of passionate intensity, that readers need to
know right now where in the Aegean, and when, the epic battles at
Orpheus took place. And immediately that "scud" is one of
those racy, scatological AngloSaxonisms
which
elevate
the
humanistically-smattered
Citizen
over his bland, philistine neighbors.

These are the Law and
the Prophets: woman as
sex object, spring as
beautiful and necessary,
time and human works
always vanishing.
I would call this nonsense, quoting one of the footnotes to Shelley,
on page 445: "Trying to summon
spirits of the dead through 'black
magic."' That is what footnotes desperately try to do, especially the egregiously redundant ones. Unavailing black magic, these little bits of
ink smattered throughout the book
drag the eye down to the depth of
the page, where lie the desiccated
bodies of Greek goddesses, English
youths prematurely dead, and Hebrew miracle-workers.
Well, but what is the solution to
the information problem? There
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are three of them, and one is ignorance, not a wholly bad thing. The
second is the dictionary, whether in
book form or software. The third
(which I will gradually lead up to)
is a strategy that no American
pedagogue will think of, any more
than Detroit imagined Datsun:
Grace and good sense. Or, elegance
and faithfulness to reality.
Consider that poets are not pedants. Despite Pound's macaronic
stanzas, Eliot's faint unguessable
echoes of Jacobean plays, and the
ingenuities of Donne. Despite
Shakespeare and other Petrarchan
sonnet-makers, who annoyingly use
sixteenth-century ways of thinking
about things (things like the cosmos, fate, order, God, governance,
nature, error, and survival) instead
of post-Darwin, post-Picasso, postHiroshima ways. Perhaps that is
worth repeating: Poets are not pedants.
What they are are bricoleurs. As
are we all. Not a Detroit word or a
New York word. Alas. They seem
like pedants, and therefore bring
on the black magic. To deal with
one illusion, summon a second illusion. Poets look an awful lot like
pedants; bring on the footnotes.
Your French dictionary is at
hand; bricoleur (a term we all salvaged from Levi-Strauss a few
years ago) is a sort of roving collector, a person who picks things up,
who finds things, who puts together things found, who is not as
methodical and efficient and predictable as the Ford assembly line.
The poet, an intelligent bricoleur, as
are we all, needs to be approached
with a bit of flair and respectful intelligence, as do we all. Instead,
therefore, of "scud" three times
(how clouds do travel), and "Orpheus" seven times (a different
view of the underworld from that
of the Gospels), the editors of an
elegant and faithful anthology
should try this strategy: Open the
book with three or four graceful
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essays, to be used whenever the
reader wants them.
"The Stories in Poets' Minds:
From the Mediterranean." That
would be a lucid account of a few
Greek myths, war stories, odysseys,
and Olympian arguments. Stick
with the materials touched in the
poems themselves (not a scudding
tour through Bulfinch's), and in a
marginal gloss give poets' last
names and page numbers, to show
how very frequently Orpheus and a
few other stories rose into the
minds of English-speaking writers.

Consider that poets are
not pedants. Despite
Pound's macaronic
stanzas, Eliot's faint
unguessable echoes of
Jacobean plays, and the
ingenuities of Donne.
The essay would remind a reader
how very like an actual human
being, sometimes, a poet is: He
tunes in on the world around him
and, exemplary, uses the things
that reading and formal education
have supplied. Knowledge is a matter of information, yes, but real
knowledge means awareness of what
real people have done with the information that seems most real to them.
What's real to the poet is not the
mere identity of "Orpheus" but the
power of the Orpheus story-which
the terse footnote cannot evoke.
A second essay would introduce
a few biblical stories, also King
James passages that have lingered
in the English ear. A third such
essay might discuss the giant fissure
in Anglo-American poetry between
about 1912 and 1922, when the
whole Aegean and Palestinian
worlds of allusion suddenly (with
some exceptions, like Eliot and
Pound) quite vanished.
A fourth essay, perhaps entitled

"Two Languages of England,"
might gracefully consider some of
the recurrent "poetic diction"
("oft," "clime," "ere," "swain") that
otherwise so much annoys the
modern reader, who is dis-graced
by "multifaceted" and "new dimensions." The essay would then consider language and phenomena
familiar to Britain but not to us
("porters larking," "hedges dipped
and rose"). The point is that North
Americans are doubly intruders
into much good English-language
poetry.
Neither the past of
Goldsmith's "Deserted Village" nor
the Lincolnshire countryside of
Larkin's "Whitsun Weddings" is
going to change for us ; we should
adjust to it, not with magic but with
intelligence.
The consequence of these essays
is, in fact, exorcism of most of the
black magic, with the few needed
footnotes then collected in one
glossary at the end of the book-a
sort of dictionary of exotica, crossword-puzzle words, fun to browse
in. We do have to keep Eliot's own
famous notes to The Waste Land
with the poem, but place them at
the end of the poem, as he did, not
at page bottom, as in the book before me.
There is one other sensible improvement to be made, and then
one frankly radical notion to introduce . First, we need to deal less
heavy-handedly with technical matters-the nature of iambic pentameter and the different kinds of
stanzas. The book before me goes
on for 10 pages with an Appendix
on Versification, part of it alphabetical.
Now the alphabet is a traitor to
reality. The reality of poetry is that
certain
tactics-stanza
forms,
rhyme schemes-have been with
poetry since we started in Beowulf
days to write simple ballads, and
then in the sixteenth century
grafted on certain decorative Italian growths. Faithfulness to reality
The Cresset

only means that the anthologizer
mention at the end of each poet's
headnote what novelty or special
technical characteristics will be observable in the selections that immediately follow. Perhaps even
some special typographical signaling (the nineteenth-century pointing finger?) would let a reader then
page through his or her book and
discover how technical concerns
have shifted (not "developed")
through several centuries. A poet is
always formally reacting to particular aspects of the past, departing or
returning, and a reader should be
shown what was being put on the
table and what into the attic.
(I do want editorial headnotessuccinct biographical and critical
comments preceding each author.
This too is grace and reality; it is
so much nicer, at the party, if you
tell me this new person comes
from Porlock on business rather
than announce merely a birth
year.)
Here's the heresy, then: Dismiss
from the anthology all smatterings
of long narratives: Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, chunks of Paradise
Lost, a character sketch from Dryden's "Absalom and Architophel,"
passages from Pope's Dunciad, and
stanzas of Byron's Don juan. All of
which are in the book at hand. Although not entirely comfortable
about it, let's do keep bits and
pieces from long poetic sequences
that are not primarily narrative:
sections from In Memoriam and
"Song of Myself' and the Dream
Songs.
Finally, having complained about
the tailfins, let me say that we do
need a rear windshield wiper. More
notes on more pages are not
wanted, also not smatterings of
wholes, and no nonfunctional appendices, like Buick portholes. But
more intelligence we do crave.
We therefore need backward
glances on a few notable poems,
supplied by major poets themMay, 1986

selves. Any reliable anthology today
will include poems by Richard Wilbur, James Dickey, and James
Wright; what if there were also an
essay by Wilbur on "L'Allegro" and
"II Penseroso"? And Dickey on
"Dover Beach," and Wright on
"Stopping by Woods on a Snowy
Evening"?
Not a hypothetical question. In a
book called Master Poems of the English Language ( 1966), on my most
convenient shelf, are such essays.
The book is out of print; one
hopes the royalties would not be
too large. The gain in class would
be considerable, I think, for the
poet James Dickey rather than the
teacher to mull over why "Dover
Beach" "has been called the first
modern poem." Dickey touches
with grace and intelligence upon
Christianity and science, diction
and
technique-and
neither
teacher nor textbook editor will
have two poems of his own, later
on in the book, which show his
earned right to discuss poetry.
But now finally: Shouldn't I, de-

spite this ranting, be grateful that
here are Harcourt Brace, Norton,
Harper, and other publishers with
really quite usable, if not ideal
teaching anthologies? Yeah, I
know. But I contend that some
ways of "packaging" are better than
others, tested by the faithfulness to
reality that I keep harping on, and
by clearly conceiving what the subject itself is and how the people behave who create the subject.
What I want young Americans to
find in a poetry anthology is not
only a smattering of poems but a
smattering of authority (poets as
critics, and the poems that have
proven they matter), a smattering
of truth (fidelity to the ways knowledge functions in human minds),
and finally a smattering of grace
(which means putting things together). Whether in Housman's
blooming woodlands or Marvell's
"deserts of vast eternity," those are
three valuable things we want to
Jearn about all semester.
From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.

Cl

The 1979 World Champs
Aaron wears the gold shirt this summer,
The Pirates' last big finish across his chest
Because every three years I've had a son
Who was eight. He can read just fine;
He knows the hand-me-down absurdities
Of sports. In the attic, when he loses
A morning in its quiet, he'll find
The garment bags of his future, read
The words he'll pull on like colors or patterns,
Deep-set in our family -language.
The rack goes on into the insulation,
And anywhere along it he could open
A season, see his brothers hanging shoeless
And strange in the incremental closet.

Gary Fincke
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South of the
Border
Albert A. Trost
One does not see many American tourists in Mexico City. Some
of the hotels that used to house
them were ruined in last year's
earthquake. They are only now
being demolished, with some still
standing scarred and empty. There
are still enough hotels remaining,
but tourists from the North are not
around in obvious numbers. Flights
from the United States bound for
Mexico City often stop first in the
resort
Cities
of Cancun
or
Acapulco. These atypical Mexican
cities are the more likely destination of U.S. visitors.
Those who do continue on to
Mexico City are likely to be part of
a three-city, one-week excursion,
and will be herded into buses for
tours of the pyramids and
museums, with little time to wander
the streets of Mexico's capital. Most
Americans would probably not take
the chance to see more of Mexico
City even if the opportunity were
offered to them. Even those who
can speak Spanish are overwhelmed by the city; those who
don't speak the language can easily
find it frightening.
Mexico City is now the world's

Albert R. Trost is Chairman of the
Department of Political Science at Valparaiso University. He visited Mexico
City and Puebla earlier this spring.
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largest city, with a 1985 population
around eighteen million. Cairo is
second with around fourteen million. Both of these cities are products of the same phenomenon, the
attraction of a modern city that is
also the center of government and
government attention in the midst
of a poor developing nation.
Everybody admits that there are
too many people in Mexico City.
The consequences of the city's
rapid,
probably
out-of-control,
growth surround you. The air, a
combination of dust and smog, is
the most obvious manifestation. On
a windy day dust is a major problem, with visibility limited to a
block or so on the fringes of the
city. The dust results from the occupation of land, previously in cultivation or forested, by squatters
looking for space for housing. As
many as 40 per cent of the 18 million people in the city may be living
in these squatter settlements, or
"lost cities."
The dwellings in these cities
often lack a water supply or
adequate sanitation. Their roofs
are made of whatever can be
found,
sometimes
corrugated
cardboard. They average six inhabitants per room. Still, by most
indicators (caloric intake, literacy,
unemployment, etc.), the plight of
these urban dwellers is much better
than that of many who continue to
live in the countryside. The result
is that Mexico City continues to act
as a powerful magnet. One-quarter
of the nation's population now lives
there.
The reputation of the city as a
provider of jobs and basic services
to its people obviously exceeds its
actual capabilities. The slums and
squatter settlements testify to that
as do the petty crime that abounds
and the beggars who dog the steps
of foreign tourists and Mexicans
alike. Even with the prospect of
one of the world's most lavish and
impressive displays of antiquities,

there are not many American
tourists who will choose to view
Mexico City's display of the problems of third-world cities.
As recently as twenty years ago,
visitors testified to the city's great
appeal and beauty. Can it ever recover its former reputation? One is
inclined to be very pessimistic, because the most direct responsibility
for Mexico City's future lies with
the Mexican government.
As is true of the capital city itself,
the Mexican government certainly
can claim its share of past glories
and accomplishments. The present
government of Mexico is the direct
heir of the Mexican Revolution of
1910-1920. This Revolution and
the governments that have followed
have established one of the best records for political stability in Latin
America or anyplace in the developing world.
The Revolution effectively took
the military and threats of coups out
of the political picture. It radically
separated church and state. It established policies that gave land to
many landless Mexicans, created
jobs in the industrial and service
sector for millions, made low-cost
health care available to almost
everyone, built schools in almost
every village, and challenged
foreign control of Mexico's natural
resources. Because of these accomplishments, the vast majority
of Mexicans remain loyal to the
Revolution, the governing party
(the Party of the Institutional Revolution), and the central government.
However, continued success is far
from inevitable, and the population
concentration in Mexico City may
be the biggest challenge of all. In
meeting these challenges, Mexico,
in common with most nations in the
Third World, is burdened by a
one-party system, a pattern of personalistic politics that emphasizes
the roles of patron and client, and
an extremely critical financial situaThe Cresset

tion. While the crisis facing Mexico
is most obviously and dramatically
presented in terms of money or
capital resources, there is also a
growing contraction of the legitimacy and the authority of the government.
Though very large percentages
of people vote in Mexican elections,
one can make the case that they are
given little real choice. All elections
for President since 1920 have been
won by the party that evolved out
of the Revolution, now known by
its acronym, PRI. Likewise, the
same party has always controlled all
but a few seats in the Congress,
and almost all of the state and
municipal administrations. Other
parties are allowed to contest elections, but they operate under
numerous handicaps.
The administration of the election system itself is in the hands of
PRI officials. Having never governed, the opposition parties do
not have much in the way of patronage or favors to offer. The
opposition parties that are the best
financed and organized are parties
to the right of PRI, with reputations for connections to the church
and business, not the kinds of links
that appeal to poor peasants and
workers imbued with the tradition
of the Revolution. At least two of
the opposition parties that stand to
the left of PRI are little more than
co-opted appendages of PRI itself.
Even within PRI there is no real
popular participation in the process
of nominating candidates for national office. Nominations within
the governing party are tightly controlled by a small group around the
President of the country. Practically
speaking, there is no institutional
vehicle for the expression of discontent, or the formulation of an
alternative set of policies. Given all
this, and with so many people clustered around the center of government, the potential for extra-institutional and extra-legal expres-
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sion is very great.
Another characteristic of politics
in Mexico that frustrates the public
discussion of policies and issues is
the continuing strength of personalism (personalismo). Most Mexicans connect with the political system either through the symbolism
of the Revolution, which is ubiquitous in Mexico, or through some
political patron who has the ability
to grant favors of material benefit
to the ordinary Mexican. In return,
the patron is given political support
and loyalty by the citizen. The exchange process resembles that in
the old city political machines in
the United States.

Administration of the
election system is in
the hands of the PRI.
Presentation and discussion of
policies is not a critical feature of
the system. Solutions to problems,
such as the excessive concentration
of people in the capital are more
likely to be seen in terms of the
granting of short-term material benefits to as many people as possible
rather than, as would make sense
in this instance, a long-term strategy of decentralization or moving
jobs and people away from Mexico
City.
The defects in the political system are made more immediate by
the economic crisis that began unfolding in 1981 and 1982. The precipitating factor, though causes run
much deeper, was the falling price
of Mexican oil in the glutted world
oil market. Mexican leaders had
been counting on the increased revenues from oil to buy continued
support from the Mexican masses
by way of increased benefits and
favors, as well as larger development schemes. Deprived of capital
from the sale of oil, Mexico became
even more dependent on other in-

ternational sources of capital and
even more vulnerable to international economic fluctuations.
Already in 1983 the country was
virtually bankrupt, running a
foreign debt of close to $100 billion. It currently lacks the funds to
even pay the interest on this debt,
and it continues to run large
budget deficits. Half of the work
force is either unemployed or seriously underemployed. The Mexican peso has been devalued so
much that even new yearly editions
of tourist guides are meaningless in
quoting prices. At this writing the
exchange rate is 465 pesos to the
dollar. In November of 1983 the
rate was 135 pesos to the dollar, and
it has been rising steadily ever
since.
The government has softened
the effect of this devaluation on the
ordinary Mexican by giving subsidies to keep the price of basic
products low. This increases budget
deficits and decreases international
confidence in Mexico as a target
for investment or further loans. As
one recent textbook on Mexican
politics puts it, "the Mexican government is under siege.
The
"siege" could become literally true,
as the presidential palace is in the
center of millions of people whose
reasons for being unhappy are not
decreasing.
Despite all these ominous problems, I would still advise American
tourists to go to Mexico City. The
beauty and the historical treasures
of the city would by themselves justify the excursion. Beyond that, the
city offers Americans a compelling
view of what they often read about
but seldom see first-hand: the
problems of developing nations.
Mexico has a magnificent tradition
and it remains a nation of great potential, but its festering problems
offer a classic instance-and one
disturbingly close to home--of the
precanous state of the Third
World.
0
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Review Essay

Animal Stories
Jill Baumgaertner

The Book
of Sorrows
By Walter Wangerin, Jr. New
York: Harper & Row. 339 pp.
$15.95.
Walter Wangerin has done it
again-actually, he has done it even
better this time. In The Book of the
Dun Cow, the winner of the American Book Award, he introduced
the rooster Chauntecleer and his
wife Pertolete, king and queen of
the creatures of the Coop, and
wove a tale about the disruption of
their peaceful kingdom by the
forces of evil. In this volume, The
Book of Sorrows, he continues their
story, picking up where the final
battle with Wyrm had left them in
the previous novel: their numbers
depleted, their Coop destroyed, but
Chauntecleer alive, much to his

Jill Baumgaertner, who teaches English at Wheaton College, serves The
Cresset both as Poetry Editor and as
regular contributor on contemporary
fiction.
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growing chagrin.
Already, hardly into the second
paragraph of this review, certain
readers are becoming restive, I
know. The index finger is reaching
for the tongue, and soon, if I don't
stop them, they will be turning the
page. I will now admit something
inadmissible. The Wind in the Willows did not fascinate me as a child.
I have never been able to finish a
Tolkien novel. Furthermore-and
this I shall have to whisper-/ read
C. S. Lewis's Narnia Chronicles to my
children, but I had to enter a near comatose state to get past volume three.
I know you, reader, and certainly
do not wish to offend those whose
hearts, minds, and livers have been
touched by these giants in the
world of fantasy. I don't consider it
your weakness, but, alas, mine, only
mine. Something, someone, somewhere (Mom, are you reading?) did
not train me properly, made me
want to get up and clean out my
closet or plant tulip bulbs whenever
talking animals began to pop their
furry little heads up between the
pages of a book.
It is a character deficiency, I
know, and yes, I have to admit that
in my pre-med adolescence I would
dissect toads in my grandfather's
garage, and in my lifetime I have
loved only one dog (who is now
thirteen and not going gently into
that good night). To top it all off,
my children's gerbils procreated
like crazy and then ate each other.
It should come as no surprise,
then , that my attitude toward animals is certainly not romantic. So I
am, to say the least, a difficult
reader when it comes to animal
fantasies and so far only two authors have been able to make me
stick around and listen for a while
to their speaking creatures: one of
these is Richard Adams, author of
W atership Down, and the other is
Walter Wangerin, Jr.
Probably the reason Wangerin's
animals are so appealing is that he

seems to know them so well.
Their personalities are distinctive
and totally appropriate. There's
John Wesley Weasel, whose idiomatic speech seems a combination of
pidgin English/German/slang: 'John
. . . he don't understand buggars
what can't control theirselves, no ..
.. Gets good advices, yump; perfectly clear commandings from the
Rooster, yump; has a working
brain atwixt his ears, yump,
yump; can hear it: saying, Shut
up , Foxy, shut up! Does he shut
up? No!"
There's Ferric, the conservative
coyote, hopelessly in love with his
fearless wife Rachel. There's Chalcedony, the emaciated hen, who resorts to hoarding cicada skeletons
(GARBAGE! Chauntecleer yells
when he discovers them). "Snacks,"
she calls them.
There's Chauntecleer himself,
the glorious rooster who mourns
the death of his friend, Mundo
Cani Dog, killed attacking Wyrm.
Actually, Chauntecleer blames himself for the death of all of the
others, for the loss of the Coopand finally, for the entire fallen
world. This mourning is so deep
that it paralyzes and almost kills the
rooster, who in the nick of time
hatches the ultimate plan: to seek
out Wyrm, kill him, and be sacrificed in the process-all of this as
atonement for the world Chauntecleer has allowed to slip into darkness and death.
All of my readers' Lutheran antennae should be up by now. And
for good reason. Walter Wangerin,
Jr., also Pastor Wangerin, a
graduate of Christ SeminarySeminex, is thoroughly orthodox
and delightfully imaginative in the
way he extricates Chauntecleer
from the dilemmas of a worksrighteousness faith. Chauntecleer's
whole problem is that he will not
receive the forgiveness that is offered to him: he does not consider
himself worthy of it and when the
The Cresset

Dun Cow (that warmly bovine carrier of honeyed milk) offers it, he
turns his back on her.
So Chauntecleer must learn the
humblest lessons of all-that giving
can be selfish when it is used as a
tool to gain power, and that forgiveness, though freely offered , is
never deserved. But the novel is
not a spinning out of moral lessons.
It is a most marvellously told tale
and Wangerin reveals his artistry
on every delightful page.

The Book of Sorrows is
not a spinning out of
moral lessons. It is a
most marvellously told
tale, and Wangerin
reveals his artistry on
every delightful page.
In a public lecture (lecture is misleading; it was a mesmenzmg,
dramatic performance) last spring,
Wangerin spoke of the power of
story to reveal truth , and the
hunger the human spirit has to be
creatively, imaginatively engaged in
story. He never spoke abstractly or
theoretically. Instead, he told
stories that contained the truth . In
similar fashion, The Book of Sorrows
does not preach; nor is the plot
manipulated to contain "message."
Instead the characters themselves
play out their tales and stumble
upon their meanings, almost, it
seems, by accident.
Meanwhile, Wangerin weaves his
rich tapestry of images and words.
Consider, for example, the picture
of a rooster crowing the canonical
hours, providing order and discipline, linking present action to
memories of the past, pushing his
brood eagerly into the future. But
when Chauntecleer is brooding and
depressed, when he has "lost himself in deep, deep frowning, " then
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"his Lauds sounded like sleet, waking the Hens with a miserable chilliness unlike the sunny praise that
they were used to .. . . Terce and
Sext and None were spikes, stabbing the Hens in their labors. . ..
And the Vespers he crowed was a
mere 'Quit."'
Consider also Pertolete, who, as
Chauntecleer's spirit deteriorates,
assumes more of the responsibilities
for keeping order, sheltering a
family of mice under her wing
when they need comforting or,
when the food supply is dangerously low, and the surly goats urinate on their rations, rebuking the
offenders and encouragmg the
other survivors. When the fox is
dying, Pertolete, with her companion, the fat hen Jasper, looks for
herbs to heal his wounds. The language is visual and poetic:
Two Hens, white in a yellow field,
walking with that thrust of the head
which suggests that they are going
secretly, on tiptoe, as spies, or comic
exaggerations of spies, placing their
claws with infinite careTwo Hens, made all the whiter by
a deep blue sky, go east across the
yellow field , walking and pausing by
turns, so that they seem two separate tears trickling down the face of
the field.

The echoes of Wangerin's reading, of his love for poetry and the
Psalms, resonate throughout the
novel. For example, George Herbert's poem "Love Ill" delicately
surfaces on one occasion. The
poem's first stanza presents Christ's
invitation to the sinner:
Love bade me welcome : yet my soul
drew back,
Guiltie of dust and sinne.
But quick-ey'd Love, observing me
grow slack
From my first entrance in,
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning
If I lack'd anything.

The speaker in the poem feels unworthy of such attention, but Love
pursues and wins him. The poem

ends with a reference
eucharistic meal:

to

the

You must sit down, sayes Love, and
taste my meat:
So I did sit and eat.

Herbert's words lurk barely beneath the surface of the scene in
which Ferric the coyote goes to his
wife after the birth of their pups.
There was motion inside, and a
very weak voice said, "Come in, Ferric."
He swallowed. And he went in .
Rachel barely visible. Rachel nickered at his entrance in . She was
lying on her side, so holy that he
drew back, guilty of dust and sin
and all the foolery he had performed before. Did he have the
right to be here? But quick-eyed
Rachel, seeing him grow slack, said,
"Ferric, sit. "
He sat.

Wangerin does this sort of thing
frequently throughout the novel,
but it is never labored or artificial.
He is so close to the literature he
has read, it is so much a part of
him, that it can't help but bubble
up occasionally in his own writing.
In similar fashion, his theology cannot be separated from his art, but
he doesn't impose his religious beliefs on his stories. His theology is,
instead, so much a part of his
breathing that it informs his artsometimes subtly, sometimes spectacularly, but it is always there.
Walter Wangerin revitalizes the
word creative, and he understands
its incarnational origins. The concreteness of the Word (the loving
presence of the Dun Cow) is a
measure for his own words. In The
Book of Sorrows he has in part written his own imaginative version of
Lamentations. He has shown a
world in suffering and chaos, but
he has also shown that, finally, in
the midst of death is music-and
God's angels are everywhere alert.
Wangerin has also written an animal fantasy that is close to perfect.

••
••
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Leftovers
Dot Nuechterlein
Here it is at last: the final word
of the publishing year. What a terrible time this is for the columnist.
On the o"rie hand there will be no
more deadlines for a while, which
being translated means no more
nasty looks and grumpy "Where's
your column"s from the editor for
several blessed months. Yea, hurray. On the other hand, there are
all those things left unsaid, so many
ideas hanging around dying to be
explored. Will another opportunity
come to try them out?
For publishing is a perilous proceeding: one's humble offerings
may displease, and any day the ax
could chop one right out of the
picture. There is also the random
nature of the mind. If hired on
(that's a euphemism, you of course
realize, since no grand salary is involved) for another term, a person
could forget the themes that
seemed so intriguing the previous
year, or, worse yet, might come to
think they are stupid and pointless.
If you have read this page before
you may have noticed that my goal
is to examine or comment upon issues of human experience that do
not normally receive much attention, or to put a different slant on
those that do. Here are some items
from my list of possible topics; they
may never appear in print again.
A. Nobody ever seems to write
about the fact that subscription renewal notices arrive earlier and
earlier these days. Does anybody
else get irritated when the plea to
"renew now before the rates go up"
arrives only a short while after the
publication starts coming in the
first place? Not to mention the
third "We're sure you've forgotten"
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and the tenth "Absolutely last
notice" when you have decided to
stop receiving stuff you don't have
time to read anyway. There's a column in there, somewhere.
B. Sometime I just have to write
about lust in the Bible. You have
noticed, have you not, that the
Good Book has some pretty dire
things to say about men "committing adultery in their hearts," etc.,
but absolutely nothing about
women sinning in this way. (Do you
suppose that means it's okay for
us? Look out, guys!) I assume that
the Matt. 5 quotation from Jesus
reflects not a lack of understanding
on the part of the Lord, but traditional religion's dichotomous view
of female as either angel or devil,
who would in the first case not
need and in the second not heed
such a warning. Whatever, that
might be worth a piece.
C. Speaking of the Bible and religion reminds me of another topic I
have considered writing about, although I probably never will.
Someone would most likely be offended, and I do not want that to
happen. But those with a particularly peculiar sense of humor
would no doubt love it.
Once upon a time, many moons
ago, my Significant Other and I
were sitting in church, when all of
a sudden I realized that he was
quietly chuckling to himself. Since
we were engaged in prayer at that
instance, I could see no obvious
reason for his mirth, and afterwards I asked what in the world he
had been thinking about to provoke such unseemly behavior.
The prayer, he said. Please explain, said I. So he did. It being the
fall of the year, the prayer had included a petition for blessings on
the fruits of the earth. He being
quick to pick up the vernacular
meaning of the term allowed as
how it was wonderful that the
church had started praying for
homosexuals.

Well, that was the beginning of a
little game we used to play. A
clergy friend contributed the line
from the hymn that says "he that
drinks shall live forever." Isn't that
terrible? It totally ruined that song
for me, and it is such a relief to
know that one of the new
hymnbooks has rewritten the verse
and omits that idea altogether.
Anyway, if I thought very hard I
could fill a page with like examples.
But I undoubtedly never shall.
D. Someday you have got to hear
about a character I once knew. He
was a local sportscaster, and he was
a scream. Once he was doing playby-play of a hockey game when the
radio suddenly went dead and
stayed that way for some time.
Eventually he came back on the air
and mentioned that he had gotten
so excited and agitated that he had
accidentally pulled the plug and
had been broadcasting to himself
all the while.
He was a very serious individual
who had no notion of how funny
he was to his audience. People were
always playing jokes on him, like
inventing fictitious leagues and
teams and reporting the scores so
faithfully that when they tired of
the game and quit calling in madeup results, he chided his listeners
for not keeping him informed
about local sports events.
E. Have you heard the latest
Women's Dress for Success item?
Do not ever, ever wear open-toed
shoes on the job, because some
man might get so inflamed over
the cleavage between your toes that
he can't keep his mind on business.
(Now Really!!)
F. I have a whole lot to say about
why I don't like the metric system;
suntanning; pierced ears; Hill Street
Blues; watching people play golf;
and many other things that most
people adore.
With any kind of luck you'll be
spared all of this. Fare thee well.
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